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The objection that a warlike device is barbarous has always been made against new weapons, which have 
nevertheless eventually been adopted. 
 





    
  istorical attempts to regulate weapons through the law of war include 
examples of both relative success and spectacular failure. Some attempts at 
weapons regulation have succeeded quite easily, with swift, widespread and 
enduring agreement followed by reasonably steadfast implementation. Other 
                                                                                                                  
1. JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES: 
THE CONFERENCE OF 1899, at 366 (1920). Captain Mahan served as a lecturer at and later 












attempts, even with respect to apparently similar technologies, have failed 
despite persistent and well-resourced campaigns. Still other endeavors have 
managed to attract initial agreement, but later proved wholly inadequate in 
the demanding conditions of armed conflict. This mixed record begs expla-
nation. Yet even with the benefit of extensive records of State practice and 
relatively complete archives of diplomatic proceedings, no theory currently 
accounts for how weapons law develops under the law of war. This article 
develops a deepened understanding of the processes and forces that have 
historically formed weapons law with a view to improving predictions of 
future advances in this critical area of conflict regulation. 
In general, the law of war regulates emerging technologies and existing 
weapons in two ways. Primarily, States have resorted to generally applicable 
principles and limitations to regulate weapon technology and use. These 
principles have crystallized through evolutions in custom, comprised of 
prolonged State practice and periodic, though increasingly rare, expressions 
of opinio juris.2 Many of these principles are now codified in treaties. They 
also find form in increasingly fine-tuned military legal doctrine applicable 
to weapons.3 This article begins by identifying the law of war principles 
most relevant to weapons law and presenting the historical record of their 
refinement and implementation by States. While law of war principles have 
proved enduring and flexible guides to the lawfulness of weapons, their 
ambiguity and abstract content will be shown in Part II to have greatly lim-
ited their regulatory effect, as well as their predictive value for advances in 
weapons law. 
In addition to principles, States have employed rules to either ban or 
limit the use, possession, production and transfer of very specific technolo-
gies of war. As with law of war principles, rules for specific weapons take 
the form of either treaty or custom. And like principles, specific regulations 
are found in military legal and tactical doctrine. However, rather than regu-
late generally, rules address themselves to specific weapons or, at most, 
families of weapons. Their formation generally involves far more deliberate 
and careful attention on the part of States. This article catalogs a wide 
range of efforts by States, international organizations, and non-
                                                                                                                  
2. See generally Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Watts, The Decline of International Humanitari-
an Law Opinio Juris and the Law of Cyber Warfare, 50 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOUR-
NAL 189 (2015). 
3. See, e.g., THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL 
LAW HANDBOOK 11–15 (2014) [hereinafter U.S. ARMY OPLAW HANDBOOK] (providing 













governmental organizations (NGOs) to regulate weapons by means of spe-
cific prohibitions or limitations on use. Particular attention is paid to points 
of disagreement at weapons conferences and concerns that have prevented 
States from accepting weapons law proposals. Part III reveals a highly di-
verse experience, with sporadic and what may seem at times capricious en-
thusiasm for specific regulations on the part of States. 
This article concludes with an effort to distill from the preceding his-
torical records, a deeper understanding of how weapons law forms under 
the law of war. Part IV suggests that a number of qualities of weapon tech-
nologies themselves contribute in great part to the prospects of regulatory 
success or failure. Careful examination of the historical record reveals the 
existence of both regulation-tolerant weapons and regulation-resistant 
weapons, identifiable by a number of criteria, including effectiveness, nov-
elty, deployment, medical compatibility, disruptiveness and notoriety. The-
se criteria are presented both to explain and inform existing weapons law, 
and also to facilitate efforts to identify weapons and emerging technology 
that may prove susceptible to law of war regulation, as well as technologies 
that will likely resist regulation. 
 
II. WEAPONS AND LAW OF WAR PRINCIPLES AND GENERAL LIMITATIONS 
 
The principles of the law of war reflect a form of standing consent to in-
ternational regulation of weapons. All weapons, regardless of their nature 
or novelty, are subject to each of the principles of the law of war.4 No fur-
ther expression of consent by States is required to apply law of war princi-
ples to new weapons. Some of the most widely accepted law of war princi-
ples are military necessity, discrimination, proportionality, and humanity or 
unnecessary suffering.5 A fifth principle known alternatively as honor or 
chivalry is also frequently mentioned. This principle generally prohibits 
                                                                                                                  
4. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 86 (July 8) (noting “the newness of nuclear weapons has been expressly re-
jected as an argument against the application to them of international humanitarian law”). 
See also TALLINN MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE r. 
20, at 75 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) (concluding that the law of war applies to “cyber 
operations conducted in the context of an armed conflict”). 
5. See OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL §§ 2.1–2.6 (2015) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL]; U.S. NAVY, 
U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB 
P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ¶ 5.3 












conduct and weapons that involve treachery or bad faith deceit in war.6 
Despite their universal application and near-universal acceptance, recita-
tions of these law of war principles are surprisingly inconsistent with re-
spect to scope and content.7 In fact, much of the indeterminacy that ac-
companies law of war weapons regulation is attributable to the vagueness, 
abstraction and uncertainty associated with these principles. 
The principles of unnecessary suffering, discrimination and honor have 
been regarded as particularly relevant to weapons law.8 Today, application 
                                                                                                                  
6. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 14–15; OFFICE OF THE 
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, CANADA, B-GJ-005-104/FP-021, LAW OF ARMED CON-
FLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS ¶ 202.7 (2001) [hereinafter CANADI-
AN MANUAL]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WAR-
FARE ¶ 3 (1956) [hereinafter U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10]. See also MICHAEL BOTHE, 
KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED 
CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENE-
VA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 233 (2d ed. revision by Michael Bothe, 2013); 2 LASSA OP-
PENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 226–27 (1944) (describing the principle of chivalry as 
introducing a “certain amount of fairness in offence and defence, and a certain mutual 
respect”). 
7. The U.S. Supreme Court has identified on three occasions three maxims of the law 
of war, including “humanity, moderation, and honor.” Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 191 
(1877); In re The Amy Warwick, The Schooner Crenshaw, The Barque Hiawatha, The 
Schooner Brilliante (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 667 (1862); Luther v. Borden, 
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (quoting EMMERICH DE VATTEL, 3 LE DROIT DE GENS OU 
PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE ch. 18, §§ 294–95 (1758). The U.S. DoD Law of War 
Manual includes five principles: military necessity, humanity, discrimination, proportionali-
ty and honor. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 5, ¶¶ 2.2–2.6 (2015). See also UNIT-
ED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JSP 383, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT ¶¶ 2.2–2.6 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL] (identifying military necessity, 
humanity, distinction and proportionality); CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 6, ¶ 202.1 
(identifying military necessity, humanity and chivalry); FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 
(GERMANY), ZDV 15/2, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL, ¶¶ 141–42 (2013) [hereinaf-
ter GERMAN MANUAL], available at http://usnwc.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=56 
16055 (identifying military necessity and humanity); U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, 
supra note 6, ¶ 3(a) (identifying necessity, humanity and chivalry as basic principles). A 
casebook published by the International Committee of the Red Cross identifies six princi-
ples of international humanitarian law: humanity, necessity, proportionality, distinction, 
prohibition on causing unnecessary suffering and independence of jus in bello from jus ad 
bellum. 1 MARCO SASSÒLI, ANTOINE A. BOUVIER & ANNE QUINTIN, HOW DOES LAW 
PROTECT IN WAR? Part I, ch. 4, 10–14 (3d ed. 2011), available at https://www.icrc.org 
/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-0739-part-i.pdf. 
8. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONFERENCE OF GOVERN-
MENT EXPERTS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 103 (1975) [herein-













of these three principles to weapons takes place primarily through States’ 
internal legal reviews of weapons.9 In this vein, Article 36 of Additional 
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides,  
 
In the study, development acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, 
means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obliga-
tion to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circum-
stances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of interna-
tional law applicable to the High Contracting Party. 
 
A few words about how law of war principles and two important pre-
cepts concerning public conscience and the environment operate in prac-
tice will illustrate the role they play in regulating weapons and weapon 
technology. At the same time, however, the persistent ambiguity of each 
principle will become clear, revealing the limits of their capacity to impose 
restraints on States’ resort to new weapons.  
 
A. Unnecessary Suffering 
 
The law of war principle perhaps most closely associated with international 
regulation of weapons and military technology is the prohibition of unnec-
                                                                                                                  
ference a report from an expert from the United Kingdom entitled “Legal Criteria for the 
Prohibition or Restriction of Use of Categories of Conventional Weapons”); Frits Kalsho-
ven, Arms, Armaments, and International Law, 191 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 183, 324 (1985-II) [hereinafter Kalshoven, Arms] (citing Colonel 
David Hughes-Morgan’s paper submitted to the 1974 Lucerne Conference). 
9. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. See, e.g., Deputy Secretary of Defense, DODD 5000.01, The 
Defense Acquisition System ¶ E1.1.15 (2003). The United States further implements the 
customary international law obligation to conduct legal reviews of weapons through ser-
vice-specific regulations. See Judge Advocate General, Department of the Air Force, 
AFI51-402, Legal Reviews of Weapons and Cyber Capabilities (2011); Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy (RD&A), Department of the Navy, SECNAVINST 5000.2C, Implementation 
and Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System ¶ 2.6 (2004); Headquarters, Department of the Army, AR 27-53, 
Review of Legality of Weapons Under International Law (1979). For a detailed perspective 
on weapons reviews under 1977 Additional Protocol I Article 36 and customary interna-
tional law, see W. Hays Parks, Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews, 8 YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 55 (2005) [hereinafter Parks, Weapons Reviews]. For 
an example of a U.S. weapon review, see W. Hays Parks, Joint Service Combat Shotgun Pro-












essary suffering, or humanity as it is also known. International codification 
of the principle of unnecessary suffering is traceable to the 1868 St. Peters-
burg Declaration, regarded by many as the first multilateral law of war 
weapons treaty. In addition to its ban on small caliber exploding projectiles, 
the 1868 Declaration condemned “employments of arms which uselessly 
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men” as “contrary to the laws of hu-
manity.”10 Multiple, subsequent law of war instruments and treaties have 
since reiterated and confirmed the principle. It is widely agreed that the 
principle of unnecessary suffering is not only a treaty obligation, but also 
reflects customary international law binding on all States.11 
While acknowledgment of the principle has long been practically uni-
versal, agreement on the precise meaning and operational limits imposed 
by the prohibition of unnecessary suffering has not.12 For instance, a trans-
lational issue arose concerning the scope of weapons addressed by the 
principle early in its history. As stated in the 1874 Brussels Declaration, a 
non-binding though foundational document for later treaties, the principle 
                                                                                                                  
10. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 
400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, 18 Martens Nou-
veau Recueil (ser. 1) 474 [hereinafter 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration]. In the spirit of the 
Declaration’s phrasing, some sources refer to a principle of “humanity” in lieu of unneces-
sary suffering. See also UK MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶¶ 2.1, 2.4. 
11. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8); 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 70, at 237 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise 
Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter ICRC CIL STUDY]; Henri Meyrowitz, The Principle of 
Superfluous Injury of Unnecessary Suffering, 34 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 
98, 103 (1994) (judging the customary status of the Hague codification of unnecessary 
suffering to be “well established”). The ICRC’s customary law study also asserts the prin-
ciple of unnecessary suffering applies beyond the rationae materiae of the treaties governing 
international armed conflict from which it is drawn. ICRC CIL STUDY, supra, at 237. Ac-
cording to the study, unnecessary suffering applies as a matter of custom to non-
international armed conflicts. Id. 
12. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 403 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski 
& Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter 1977 AP COMMENTARY] (observing that 
the principle of unnecessary suffering was never contested during the several conferences 
of experts that led to the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, although 
no “wide-ranging agreement on its significance and scope” could be attained). See also LU-
CERNE REPORT, supra note 8, at 7. This report captured the view of some experts assem-
bled to study the possibility of generating weapons regulations who viewed the term “un-













prohibits weapons “calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.”13 The ordi-
nary meaning of the phrase “calculated to” suggested an element of delib-
erate design or specific intent. Weapons purposely devised to inflict injury 
beyond that required to accomplish military objectives—most commonly 
destruction of materiel or rendering combatants hors de combat—violate the 
principle under this meaning. Weapons that incidentally, unintentionally or 
accidentally inflict unnecessary suffering seem outside the ambit of the 
principle.  
Drawn in large part from the 1874 Declaration, the 1899 Hague Con-
vention’s annexed Regulations included an expression of the principle of 
unnecessary suffering. However, the English translation of the official 
French version inexplicably abandoned the term “calculated to cause” in 
favor of the term “of a nature to cause.” The change presented an interest-
ing interpretive dilemma, at least for English-speaking lawyers. Ordinary 
canons of interpretation counsel lawyers to render distinct meanings to dif-
ferent terms and phrases. Although the relevant phrases appear in separate 
legal instruments, the direct lineage between the Brussels Declaration and 
1899 Hague Regulations is indisputable. Therefore, some accounting of the 
change of phrase between instruments certainly seemed in order. The term 
“nature” referred in this context to the essential qualities or properties of a 
thing; the inherent and inseparable combination of properties . . . giving it 
its fundamental character.”14 Accordingly, resort to the term “of a nature 
to” seemed to shift the focus of legal reviews of weapons under the unnec-
essary suffering principle away from the intentions of States and weapon 
designers and toward the inherent qualities of weapons. Analyses under the 
“of a nature to” standard might require not only consideration of the 
weapons designers’ intended effects, but also a more thorough examination 
of the likely and even possible range of injuries that could result from a 
weapon’s normal battlefield use. Under this articulation, unintentional, in-
cidental and even accidental infliction of unnecessary suffering might well 
run afoul of the principle. Efforts to shift analyses of unnecessary suffering 
to effects of weapons, rather than intended design, have proved difficult to 
implement and have drawn significant criticism and reservations from 
                                                                                                                  
13. Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, 
Brussels art. 13(e), Aug. 27, 1874, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 23 (Die-
trich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter 1874 Brussels Declaration] 
(emphasis added). 












States.15 Adding to confusion, the English translation of the 1907 Hague 
Regulations returned to the phrase “calculated to cause,” although the offi-
cial French expression remained unchanged.16 Indeed, to French speakers, 
the entire debate itself must seem somewhat “unnecessary.” 
In 1997, in response to nearly a century of ambiguity surrounding the 
principle, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) initiated 
the Superfluous Injury and Unnecessary Suffering (SIrUS) Project.17 The 
SIrUS Project was notable in two respects. First, it introduced a fresh per-
spective on analyses of the longstanding prohibition on unnecessary suffer-
ing. Where previous application of the prohibition had examined the intent 
of parties employing a weapon or the weapon’s intended design or nature, 
the SIrUS Project proposed examining weapons’ effects exclusively. Rely-
ing heavily on medical reports of survival rates and the state of widely 
available field medical treatments, the Project then proposed to ban weap-
ons that produced the most severe or untreatable wounds. The Project’s 
authors purported to supplant subjective State intent to cause unnecessary 
suffering with an objective medical perspective on the inherent characteris-
tics of weapons.18  
The Project drew from a large ICRC database of war wounds. Parame-
ters included “the proportion of large wounds; mortality; the relative pro-
portion of central and limb injuries; the duration of hospital stay; the num-
ber of operations required; the requirement for blood transfusion; and the 
extent of severe and permanent disability in the survivors.”19 The Project 
then correlated these medical parameters with the foreseeable effects of 
various weapons, but especially small arms bullets. The Project identified 
four criteria, the presence of any one of which was sufficient to indicate a 
weapon caused unnecessary suffering.20  
                                                                                                                  
15. Donna M. Verchio, Just Say No! The SIrUS Project: Well-intentioned, but Unnecessary 
and Superfluous, 51 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 183, 200 n.84 (2001) (describing State reac-
tions to the ICRC’s SIrUS proposal). 
16. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(a), an-
nexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations]. 
17. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, THE SIRUS PROJECT: TO-
WARDS A DETERMINATION OF WHICH WEAPONS CAUSE “SUPERFLUOUS INJURY OR UN-
NECESSARY SUFFERING” (1997). 
18. Id. at 5. 
19. Id. at 7. 














Apart from appearing to resort to objective criteria, the proposal had 
the additional benefit of reflecting recent codification of the unnecessary 
suffering prohibition. Where, as noted above, prior understandings and 
codifications of unnecessary suffering had prohibited weapons “calculated to 
cause unnecessary suffering,”21 the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Gene-
va Conventions prohibited weapons “of a nature to cause . . . unnecessary suf-
fering.”22 Whichever historical account of the principle forbidding unneces-
sary suffering proved correct, the SIrUS Project purported to better cap-
ture the letter of the ascendant articulation of the law.  
Scientific debate and technical quarrels, however, plagued the nascent 
Project. Beyond objections to resorting exclusively to effects to evaluate 
unnecessary suffering, States raised a number of methodological questions 
concerning the data on which the Project relied. That wound data were de-
rived from ICRC rather than military medical hospitals meant the majority 
of wounds analyzed were to civilians, who lacked medical training, equip-
ment and personnel that usually accompany armed forces and perform first 
response aid.23 By 2001, the ICRC abandoned the SIrUS Project and with it 
further attempts to reduce the abstraction of the principle.24  
More than a century after its first codification, vindication of the cus-
tomary term “calculated to” came (momentarily) in the form of interna-
tional criminal law. In 1993, the United Nations Security Council created 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.25 The Tri-
bunal’s statute criminalizes “employment of poisonous weapons or other 
weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.”26 However, less than ten 
years later, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), a 
standing tribunal with jurisdiction over certain war crimes, codified the 
principle of unnecessary suffering as “employing weapons, projectiles and 
                                                                                                                  
(1) specific disease, specific abnormal physiological state, specific abnormal psychological 
state, specific and permanent disability or specific disfigurement; (2) field mortality of 
more than 25% or a hospital mortality of more than 5%; (3) Grade 3 wounds as measured 
by the Red Cross wound classification; or (4) effects for which there is no well recognized 
and proven treatment. 
 
Id. 
21. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 16, art. 23(e) (emphasis added). 
22. AP I, supra note 9, art. 35(2) (emphasis added). 
23. Verchio, supra note 15, at 200 n.84. 
24. Parks, Weapons Reviews, supra note 9, at 88. 
25. S.C Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993). 
26. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia art. 3(a), 













material and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous 
injury or unnecessary suffering.”27  
Still, the legal status of the ICC Statute’s provision on unnecessary suf-
fering is dubious. The Rome Statute places entry into force of its unneces-
sary suffering provision on hold. The relevant article is only enforceable 
“provided that such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of war-
fare are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are included in an 
annex to this Statute . . . .” This compromise was necessary to secure 
agreement among States and likely reflects the unsettled and wide-ranging 
views on the principle of unnecessary suffering.28 To date, States have not 
produced the annex of weapons agreed to cause unnecessary suffering re-
quired by the Statute to activate the Court’s jurisdiction. Moreover, the el-
ements of war crimes do not address unnecessary suffering because no 
such annex has been produced.29 It seems then that prosecution of the 
principle of unnecessary suffering is at present not within the jurisdiction 
of the Court—a significant gap in the Court’s power to enforce the law of 
war and demonstrative of a glaring lack of State commitment to weapons 
law in the international legal system.30 
In sum, it is difficult to identify a generally consistent or accepted man-
ner of interpretation or even articulation of the principle of unnecessary 
suffering.31 There appears to be consistent agreement that some weapons, 
                                                                                                                  
27. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8.2.(b)(xx), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Rome Statute] (emphasis added). 
28. WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 
ON THE ROME STATUTE 243–47 (2010) (relating the negotiating history that produced 
Article 8.2(b)(xx)). 
29. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES 
UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 297 (Knut Dö-
rmann et al. eds., 2003). 
30. See id.; Judith Gardham, Crimes Involving Disproportionate Means and Methods of Warfare 
under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR IGOR BLISHCHENKO 537, 
555 (José Doria, Hans-Peter Gasser & M. Cherif Bassiouni eds., 2009). 
31. See THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT DESKBOOK 155 (2014) (instructing “[t]here is no agreed upon definition for 
unnecessary suffering”); UK MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶ 6.1.2 (noting “the law does not de-
fine unnecessary suffering, and views can differ markedly”); id ¶ 6.1.4; 1977 AP COMMEN-
TARY, supra note 12, at 410; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONFER-
ENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 
8 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 LUGANO REPORT] (noting long-standing dispute over the 













by their nature, cause unnecessary suffering. States have identified weapons 
employing fragments that evade detection by x-ray, poison and barbed 
weapons as inflicting needless injury.32 Ultimately, however, the linguistic 
variations and competing interpretations of the principle of unnecessary 
suffering may simply reflect the inherent limitations of regulating by resort 
to principles. As the subsequent principles demonstrate, law of war princi-
ples regulate in a very general manner, often relying to a greater degree on 




No law of war principle enjoys wider acknowledgment than the principle 
of discrimination.34 At its simplest, the principle of discrimination requires 
belligerents to maintain a distinction during attacks between combatants 
and civilians and between military objectives and civilian objects.35 In each 
case, belligerents must limit attacks to the former and safeguard, to the ex-
tent practicable, the latter. Although the principle has been honored to 
                                                                                                                  
32. ICTY Statute, supra note 26, art. 3(a) (enumerating the crime of “employment of 
poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering”); NAVY 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 5, ¶ 9-1; UK MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶¶ 6.6, 6.11.2; 
U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note 6, ¶ 34. 
33. The term “indiscriminateness” was used by Colonel David Hughes-Morgan to de-
scribe how the principle of discrimination applies specifically to legal considerations of 
weapons at the earliest conference in the process that led to the prevailing regulatory re-
gime for weapons. LUCERNE REPORT, supra note 8. 
34. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 78 (July 8) (recognizing distinction and humanity as cardinal principles of the law of 
war). 
35. Whether the principle of discrimination—and many other law of war principles 
and rules of precautions in attack—applies to operations during armed conflict that do not 
amount to attacks is unsettled. See Michael N. Schmitt, “Attack” as a Term of Art in Interna-
tional Law: The Cyber Operations Context, in 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER 
CONFLICT 283, 289–90 (Christian Czosseck, Rain Ottis & Katarine Ziolkowski eds., 2012) 
(defining the notion of attack by reference to “violence” and interpreting “attack” as a 
threshold of application for targeting rules); INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED 
CROSS, 31ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT: 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY 
ARMED CONFLICT 37 (2011) (asserting that principles of the law of war, including military 
necessity and discrimination, apply to all operations, even those short of attack, during 












greatly varying degrees in twentieth century combat,36 its status as lex lata is 
firm, cemented by numerous clear treaty provisions and confirmed by the 
judgments of recent international criminal law tribunals.37 
Discrimination figured early in modern efforts to regulate combat. Lit-
tle if any disagreement arose concerning the principle’s application to at-
tacks and methods of warfare. By the early 1970s, however, a dispute con-
tested the extent to which the principle applied to weapons and means of 
warfare per se. Although experts agreed easily that no weapon could be 
lawfully employed in an indiscriminate manner or method, the question 
whether a weapon or means of warfare itself could be regarded as inherent-
ly indiscriminate proved more contentious.38 Some experts considered that 
discrimination only regulated how weapons were used and that no weapon 
could be preemptively categorized as violating the principle simply by vir-
tue of its nature or properties. At minimum, these experts argued a weap-
on-focused application of the principle had not yet crystallized into positive 
law. Other experts contended that indiscriminateness could take the form 
of a prohibition of weapons that “cannot be accurately directed against mil-
itary targets” simply by virtue of their properties and regardless of the in-
tention of the parties employing them.39 
Vindication of the expansive, now-prevailing view of discrimination 
with respect to weapons did not take long (at least not by law of war devel-
opment standards). Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions addresses the principles of the law of war, including intricate 
treatment of the principle of discrimination. The Protocol articulates a sep-
arate dimension of discrimination specifically applicable to weapons 
                                                                                                                  
36. See, e.g., PERTTI JOENNIEMI & ALLAN ROSAS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CON-
VENTIONAL WEAPONS: A STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES AND IN-
TEREST CONFIGURATIONS ON THE EFFORTS TO MODERNIZE THE INTERNATIONAL LE-
GAL CRITERIA FOR THE CHOICE OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN WAR 26 (1975). Joen-
niemi and Rosas report civilian combat losses at about 5 percent of total casualties in 
World War I, at 50 percent in World War II, at 70–80 percent in the Vietnam War and 
somewhat lower in hostilities in the Middle East in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Id. at 26 
n. 1. 
37. AP I, supra note 9, art. 48; Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeal 
Judgment, ¶¶ 190–91 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006) (identify-
ing the principle of distinction); Prosecutor v. Blaški , Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal 
Judgment, ¶¶ 109, 113 n.220, 157 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 29, 
2004) (describing customary duties of discrimination between combatants and civilians). 
38. LUCERNE REPORT, supra note 8, at 10–11. 













through provisions widely regarded largely to reflect custom.40 To the ques-
tion whether the principle of discrimination regulates weapons per se, Arti-
cle 51(4) states in relevant part, “Indiscriminate attacks are: . . . (b) those 
which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a 
specific military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or means of 
combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Proto-
col.”41 
Frequently cited examples of weapons that violate the principle of dis-
crimination per se are certain missiles42 and bacteriological weapons.43 Mis-
siles and rockets that lack guidance systems or involve a wide radius of im-
pact error are thought to be indiscriminate because they cannot reliably be 
aimed at military objectives. A highly respected analysis of AP I, Article 
51(4)(b) also cites “‘blind’ weapons” as examples of means that do not 
comply.44 The authors include as specific examples of blind or indiscrimi-
nate means, “[a]ttaching incendiary or antipersonnel bombs to free floating 
balloons” and “[l]and mines, laid without customary precautions.”45  
Biological and some chemical weapons are generally judged to be indis-
criminate by virtue of the uncontrollable nature of their effects under the 
AP I, Article 51(4)(c) standard. Many biological agents are capable of re-
production and may spread well beyond their intended targets. Some 
chemical weapons may be scattered beyond their objectives by unpredicta-
ble atmospheric conditions. Significant debate exists whether nuclear 
weapons are inherently indiscriminate or incapable of being directed at a 
specific military objective. Although the International Court of Justice was 
unable to conclude in an advisory opinion that nuclear weapons were illegal 
per se, the Court advised at minimum that their use remained conditioned 
by the law of war principle of distinction.46 
 
                                                                                                                  
40. See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 5, §§ 6.7.2, 6.7.4. 
41. AP I, supra note 9, art. 51(4) (emphasis added). 
42. UK MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶ 6.4.1. (citing German V1 flying bombs and Scud 
missiles used by the Iraqi armed forces during the Persian Gulf conflict of 1991); CANA-
DIAN MANUAL, supra note 6, ¶ 509 (citing Scud missiles as examples of weapons that can-
not be directed at a specific legitimate target). 
43. CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 6, ¶ 516 (citing bacteriological/biological weap-
ons as “affecting the civilian population in an indiscriminate fashion”). 
44. BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 6, at 346.  
45. Id. 
46. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 














Honor, the final fundamental principle considered in the legality of weap-
ons, concerns longstanding notions of noble warfare. The principle of 
honor has a complicated history in the regulation of not only conduct, but 
also of weapons deemed acceptable by belligerents. Article 23(b) of the 
1907 Hague Regulations forbids parties to “kill or wound treacherously 
individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army.” The generality of the 
expression is difficult to explain and leaves much to interpretation. The 
term “honor” even fell out of use in U.S. military legal doctrine, although it 
has recently been revived.47 For most of its history, States seemed content 
to leave determinations of honor to subjective interpretation. Later codifi-
cations of the principle, however, eliminated some ambiguity, but not 
without arguably narrowing the principle’s traditionally broad scope of 
coverage.48 
Today, honor is codified as the widely acknowledged war crime of per-
fidy.49 The most broadly accepted codification of perfidy is the prohibition 
found in AP I, Article 37, which states,  
 
It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. 
Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he 
is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of inter-
national law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confi-
dence, shall constitute perfidy. The following acts are examples of perfi-
dy: 
 
(a) the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a sur-
render; 
(b) the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness; 
(c) the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status . . . .50 
 
                                                                                                                  
47. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 5, §§ 2.6–2.6.3.2. 
48. See generally Sean Watts, Law-of-War Perfidy, 219 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 106 (2014) 
(detailing various codifications and refinements of the prohibition of perfidy derived from 
more general notions of treachery). 
49. ICC Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 8.2(b)(xi). 
50. The United States does not consider the AP I reference to “capture” as an effect 
sufficient to constitute perfidy under customary international law. DOD LAW OF WAR 













Recalling the earlier-mentioned debate concerning discrimination, the 
AP I expression of perfidy applies far more easily to conduct than to 
weapons. While not exhaustive, the listed examples describe conduct and 
methods rather than weapons or means of warfare. Addressing permissible 
ruses as distinguished from perfidy, AP I delves into means, with mention 
of “camouflage, decoys, mock information, and misinformation.” The am-
bit of AP I perfidy might by negative implication include means or weap-
ons that inherently or by their nature—and especially their appearance—
betray enemy confidence in law of war protection, such as booby trapped 
medical supplies or civilian objects. This view is disputed, however, and 
likely does not attract unanimous support.51  
This view also did not prevail at early weapons review conferences. In 
1974, a proposal to address perfidious weapons that failed to secure unan-
imous support read, “The use of any weapon in such a way that it places 
the intended victim under a moral, juridical or humanitarian obligation to 
act in such a way as to endanger his safety, is perfidious.”52 Concern 
emerged that the terms “moral and juridical or humanitarian obligation” 
were too ambiguous to apply or enforce with respect to weapons.53 The 
majority of experts preferred to address weapons as being perfidious or 
treacherous in certain conditions or when they were employed in a prohib-
ited manner, rather than being inherently so.54 
Today, the principle of honor remains perhaps the most ambiguous of 
law of war principles applicable to weapons. States appear to remain con-
tent with a high degree of abstraction with respect to its content and mean-
ing. All the same, weapons, especially novel weapons, are frequently indict-
ed as treacherous or dishonorable. The weapon most consistently associat-
ed with the principle has been poison. Booby traps and other weapons or 
means of warfare appearing as innocent objects have frequently been 
judged to be treacherous or dishonorable means of warfare per se.55 
 
                                                                                                                  
51. See, e.g., Rogier Bartels, Killing with Military Equipment Disguised as Civilian Objects is 
Perfidy, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 20, 2015), http://justsecurity.org/21285/disguising-military-
weapons-civilian-equipment-perfidy-or-be/; Kevin Jon Heller, No, Disguising Military 
Equipment as Civilian Objects to Help Kill Isn’t Perfidy, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 24, 2015), 
http://justsecurity.org/21391/no-disguising-military-equipment-civilian-objects-kill-
perfidy/. 
52. LUCERNE REPORT, supra note 8, at 70. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 11, 70. 












D. The Martens Clause 
 
In addition to the fundamental principles of the law of war, other very gen-
eral rules and prohibitions of general application have emerged that bear 
on the legality of weapons during armed conflict. The Hague Convention 
applicable to land warfare, produced at the First Hague Peace Conference 
in 1899, included perhaps the most general of law of war restraints still in 
use today. Drafted and proposed by the formidable Russian chief of dele-
gation to the Hague Conference, Fyodor de Martens, the eponymous Mar-
tens Clause reads:  
 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Con-
tracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the 
Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under 
the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they 
result from the usages established between civilised nations, from the 
laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience . . . .56 
 
Martens originally submitted the Clause as a consolation to and en-
ticement of support from smaller European States who feared the Hague 
treaties would too strictly limit their means of defense against invasion by 
stronger military powers.57 The Martens Clause responded to militarily 
weak States’ misgivings by guaranteeing the continued operation of the law 
of war, thought by these States as a way to preserve means and methods of 
defense essential to their survival, especially through resort to unconven-
tional forces and spontaneous resistance by an armed population.  
In the nearly 120 years since it first appearance, however, the Clause 
has taken on a novel role as law of war gap filler. Resort to the Clause is 
made frequently to support not only the persistent and complimentary role 
of custom to treaty law, but also the possibility of other legal regimes, such 
as international human rights law, operating simultaneously with the law of 
war.58 Since 1899, States have included the Clause in a number of major law 
of war instruments with this purpose clearly in mind.59 
                                                                                                                  
56. Convention No. II Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land pmbl., July 
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. 403, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention II]. 
57. WILLIAM I. HULL, THE TWO HAGUE CONFERENCES AND THEIR CONTRIBU-
TIONS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 215–20 (1908). 
58. See Michael Salter, Post-war Developments of the Martens Clause: The Codification of 
Crimes Against Humanity Applicable to Acts of Genocide, 2 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HU-













One of the chief interpretive difficulties concerning the Martens 
Clause, especially as applied to weapons, is whether the Clause carries sub-
stantive weight of its own. A view expressed in early weapons law confer-
ences considered the terms “laws of humanity” and “requirements of the 
public conscience” as independent legal standards to be applied and en-
forced separately from other relevant international legal obligations.60 Ac-
cording to this view, all weapons would be reviewed for compliance with 
these general and open-natured limitations. States adopting new weapons 
would be required to identify workable standards for “laws of humanity” 
and presumably measure weapons against these standards. Similarly, and 
perhaps more problematically, legal reviews of weapons would require at-
tention to seemingly subjective and malleable public conscience or the even 
more fickle standards of public opinion. Today, interpreted as an inde-
pendent and self-executing obligation, the Martens Clause would prove a 
particularly important limitation given that so many weapons, for any 
number of reasons, have garnered strong public reactions and condemna-
tion. 
A competing view, however, has regarded the Martens Clause more 
narrowly—more as a placeholder or clause of incorporation. According to 
this view, the terms of the Clause do not constitute legal standards them-
selves. Instead, they incorporate by reference other norms, requiring a fur-
ther showing that a norm of international law, separate from those of the 
                                                                                                                  
or Simply Pie in the Sky, 11 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (2000) 
[hereinafter Cassese]; Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates 
of Public Conscience, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (2000). 
59. See, e.g., Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539; Convention (I) for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 63, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 62, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War art. 142, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 158, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; 1977 AP I, supra note 9, art. 1(2); Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-international Armed Conflicts pmbl., June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Convention 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May 
Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects pmbl., Oct. 10, 
1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1980 CCW]. 












instrument that contains the Clause, provides a rule for decision.61 The 
norm in question would thus have to be derived from an independent and 
accepted source of international law such as treaty or custom.62 Under this 
view, the Clause would incorporate or merely make the clear the continued 
application of other rules and norms not included in the instrument or legal 
regime under consideration. A further, still narrower view, perhaps closest 
to its original intent, denied the Clause legal status at all. This view regarded 
it as an entirely non-legal, political statement, reminding State parties that 
law is not the exclusive international limitation on their conduct and that 
they remain answerable to international politics and opinion.63 
A final understanding of the Martens Clause regards the Clause in the 
nature of an interpretive guide.64 Rather than attribute independent sub-
stantive force, or for that matter mere incorporation of collateral rules, the 
interpretive view employs the Clause as a lens through which law of war 
and other international law rules are applied during armed conflict. Accord-
ing to this view, the terms humanity and public conscience act as guides for 
the application of rules and the resolution of ambiguities.65  
For now, it seems non-substantive views of the Martens Clause likely 
prevail. The chief function of the Clause today is to remind belligerents of 
the many sources of legal restraints in war. It acts somewhat like a reverse 
parol evidence clause in contract law.66 If a parol evidence clause limits the 
extent of contracting parties’ agreement to terms of a written contract and 
prohibits resort to extrinsic evidence of legal obligations, the Martens 
Clause constitutes somewhat the reverse—an open-ended incorporation of 
the full extent of State parties’ relevant legal obligations. Ultimately, neither 
the substantive view nor the prevailing placeholder view accords especially 
closely to the original intent or meaning of the Clause, leaving its present—
                                                                                                                  
61. Id. at 12. 
62. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
33 U.N.T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179. The Statute is widely regarded as an accurate articulation 
of the sources of international law. 
63. LUCERNE REPORT, supra note 8, at 12. 
64. Jochen von Bernstorff, Martens Clause, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, ¶ 13 (Dec. 2009), available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view 
/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e327.  
65. Id. See also Cassese, supra note 58, at 190. 
66. See Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of 
Contractual Interpretation, 146 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 533, 535 (1998) 













and perhaps future—meanings for purposes of international weapons law 
somewhat unclear. 
 
E. Environmental Effects 
 
A final law of war limitation generally applicable to weapons, which com-
pliments but likely does itself not form part of the fundamental principles 
of the law of war, addresses means of warfare and the environment. The 
prohibition finds expression in two treaties. First, AP I, Article 35(3) pro-
vides, “It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are 
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment.” Second, the 1976 Convention on the 
Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modifi-
cation Techniques (ENMOD) prohibits “military or any other hostile use 
of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting 
or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other 
State party.”67 Ratifications of AP I now total 174 States.68 Seventy-seven 
States have ratified ENMOD.69 The ICRC has concluded that the prohibi-
tions of Article 35(3) and ENMOD reflect customary international law ap-
plicable to international and, “arguably,” to non-international armed con-
flicts.70 
Two differences between AP I and ENMOD with respect to weapons 
regulation merit mention. First, although they share a common concern for 
persistent environmental effects of hostilities, AP I and ENMOD regulate 
differently. Where AP I addresses weapons that have extreme effects on the 
environment, ENMOD forbids converting the environment itself into a 
weapon to injure or coerce an enemy. Article II of ENMOD makes clear 
that the Convention’s prohibition addresses only “deliberate manipulation 
of natural processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the 
                                                                                                                  
67. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Envi-
ronmental Modification Techniques art. I, Dec. 10, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S 
151 [hereinafter 1976 ENMOD]. 
68. Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ 
ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=D9E6B6264D7723C3C12563CD002D6CE4&action=op
enDocument (last visited June 29, 2015). 
69. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modifi-
cation Techniques, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=2AC88 
FF62DB2CDD6C12563CD002D6EC1&action=openDocument (last visited June 29, 
2015). 












Earth.” The difference is important and explains some States’ persistent 
objection to AP I, Article 35(3) notwithstanding their ratification of 
ENMOD,71 as well as other States’ submissions of understandings with 
respect to the AP I provision.72  
The United States, for instance, while a party to ENMOD, rejects Arti-
cle 35(3) as an expression of custom, maintaining that the principles of dis-
crimination and proportionality guard against weapons resulting in exces-
sive incidental environmental damage rather than the Article’s specific pro-
hibition.73 Second, it should be noted that where violation of Article 35(3) 
requires cumulative criteria of “widespread, long-term, and severe damage 
to the natural environment,” ENMOD enumerates the same criteria dis-
junctively such that any single effect is sufficient to constitute a breach. 
A final consideration regarding weapons and the environment concerns 
scope of application. Reminiscent of earlier law of war si omnes clauses, 
ENMOD’s prohibition is limited to hostilities among parties.74 ENMOD is 
not as widely ratified as many law of war treaties; however, State parties 
include admitted and likely nuclear States with the exceptions of France, 
Israel and South Africa. It is possible that the customary incarnation of 
ENMOD’s prohibition operates without regard to advance reciprocal 
commitment, meaning the prohibition would apply universally regardless 
of the adversary. 
Overall, one finds among the principles of the law of war meaningful 
yet pervasively ambiguous and abstract limits on weapons and war tech-
nology. The advantages of regulating weapons by resort to principles such 
as the prohibitions of unnecessary suffering, indiscriminateness, dishonor 
and other rules are clear. General principles offer a flexible and adaptive 
                                                                                                                  
71. Written Statement of the Government of the United States of America 24 (June 
20, 1995), Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996, 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/8700.pdf (characterizing AP I, Article 
35(3) as a “new rule”). 
72. Although it has not ratified AP I, the United States submitted a declaration upon 
signature stating, “the rules established by this protocol were not intended to have any 
effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.” Protocols Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions, Reservations and Declarations, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, 
supra note 13, at 817. France and the United Kingdom submitted understandings of AP I 
Article 35(3) which state, “risk of damage to the natural environment . . . is to be assessed 
objectively on the basis of the information available at the time under consideration.” Id. 
at 800, 816. 
73. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 5, §§ 6.10.3.1, 19.20.1.5. 













approach to regulation capable of evolving along with State practice and 
the rapid development of new weapons and technology. It is no accident 
that these principles have survived as the primary restraints on weapons 
despite revolutionary changes in armaments. States clearly approve of and 
appreciate the flexibility and, frankly, the degree of autonomy regulation by 
resort to broad principles has provided. 
Yet it is also clear that regulating weapons by principle entails notewor-
thy costs and disadvantages. The ambiguity that makes regulation by broad 
principles attractive to States reluctant to cede sovereignty to the interna-
tional legal system also greatly limits these principles’ effectiveness at hu-
manizing war. As demonstrated above, what amounts to unnecessary suf-
fering is still highly uncertain and determined in most cases by States’ indi-
vidual and subjective evaluations. Similarly, whether means of war amount 
to treachery or constitute acceptable ruses remains highly indeterminate. 
Accordingly, the predictive value of law of war principles as restraints on 
weapons is greatly limited. In light of their inherent ambiguity, as well as 
significant variance in State practice, it is exceptionally difficult, in all but 
the most obvious cases, to forecast State consensus as to whether a weap-
on violates any of these principles.  
 
III. SPECIFIC REGULATIONS AND PROHIBITIONS 
 
Since ancient times, States and other organizations have attempted to de-
velop specific rules applicable to particular weapons alongside general prin-
ciples. The same considerations that informed the law of war principles 
prohibiting unnecessary suffering, indiscriminate weapons and dishonor 
often motivated efforts to regulate or to ban specific weapons outright. 
Political, economic and other factors also appear to have influenced at-
tempts at weapons bans and regulations and must be considered in any 
comprehensive understanding of law of war weapons regulations. Despite 
the many considerations that have gone into weapons law development, 
understanding the prospects for regulation of weapons benefits profoundly 
from an examination of the history of efforts to regulate specific weapons. 
While States’ general approaches to, and relationships with, international 
law have surely been influential, the qualities and properties of various 
weapons themselves seem to have played a significant part in the develop-
ment of weapons law.  
Early efforts to develop specific weapons rules were not especially suc-












codification, observed in the code he submitted for adoption by Union 
forces in the American Civil War, “no conventional restriction of the 
modes adopted to injure the enemy is any longer admitted.”75 However, by 
the mid-twentieth century, and especially by the late-twentieth century, the 
prospects for success at regulating weapons through international bans 
proved brighter. Overall, historical results have been greatly varied, but 




Some of the earliest law of war regulations on specific weapons addressed 
poisons.76 Ancient Greeks widely forbade the use of poisoned weapons 
through custom.77 Because of poison’s secretive nature, ancient Indian so-
ciety codified a comprehensive poison ban.78 Romans reportedly regarded 
use of poison, especially for assassinations, as a form of prohibited treach-
ery and specifically banned its use.79 By medieval times, military custom and 
usage included a poison prohibition.80 Academic treatises, so important to 
the recognition of the custom and usages of the law of war in the period 
between the Middle Ages and the modern era, also widely acknowledged a 
ban on poison.81 By the age of positivism, the poison ban featured consist-
ently and unequivocally in States’ early efforts to codify the law of war in 
treaties.82 
                                                                                                                  
75. U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the 
United States in the Field art. 30, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863, reprinted in THE 
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13, at 3 [hereinafter 1863 Lieber Code]. 
76. See 3 ALEXANDER GILLESPIE, A HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF WAR: THE CUSTOMS 
AND LAWS OF WAR WITH REGARDS TO ARMS CONTROL 87 (2011); DOCUMENTS ON THE 
LAWS OF WAR 53 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2001). 
77. 2 COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT 
GREECE AND ROME 209, 221 (1911). 
78. THE LAWS OF MANU 28 (Lecture VII, 90) (John Murdoch ed., trans., The Chris-
tian Literature Society 1907) (c. 100 B.C.). 
79. PHILLIPSON, supra note 77, at 231. 
80. See LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 142 (2d 
ed. 2000). 
81 See, e.g., 3 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRES ch. 4, §§15–16 (1625), 
reprinted in 2 CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 651–53 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925). 
82. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 16, art. 23(a); Regulations Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(a), annexed to Convention No. II with Respect 
to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 













The origins of humanity’s persistent resolve to outlaw the use of poi-
son in warfare are largely instinctive but worthy of study. First, it has been 
observed that poisons by their nature do not belong. They have been aptly 
defined as “foreign and dangerous substance[s] placed where they should not 
be, whether in the human body or the environment. They contravene the 
natural order.” 83 This feature of poisons surely explains much of the hu-
man and legal revulsion to their use.  
A second, instinctive explanation for the poison taboo is that poisons 
often thwart expectations—there is a sense that a betrayal accompanies the 
harm resulting from their use. Poisons most often take their victims una-
ware and poisoners often evade detection and accountability. Although war 
is understood to involve death and suffering, poisons upset the equilibrium 
of lethal expectations to which combatants ordinarily resign themselves by 
entering combat. 
Some scholars identify in humans a strong genetic predisposition 
against poison use. Primates’ innate fear of snakes and arachnids has been 
identified in primitive human societies. Strategies of poison avoidance, in-
cluding general contempt for poisons, likely proved essential attributes of 
surviving lines of primate species.84 Humans have historically associated 
poison use with insects, snakes, and other pests and species of human dis-
dain.85 Yet even these “lower species” reserve use of poison to predation 
and encounters with other species. Examples of conspecific poison use in 
nature are reportedly rare.86 Likewise, although some primitive human soci-
eties used poison in warfare, the consensus is that such use was exceedingly 
uncommon. Even tribes skilled at poison use in hunting appear to have 
usually refrained from its use against human adversaries.87  
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Human notions linking poison with mysticism and medicine have also 
been cited to explain the taboo.88 Many poisons and their effects evaded 
human understanding for centuries. Poisons act subtly and slowly in com-
parison to kinetic weapons. Moreover, the line between poison and remedy 
has proved fine and difficult to identify. Distinguishing substances that en-
hanced survival from those that threatened it was an enormously important 
human undertaking in primitive societies.89 Toxic weapons strained finely 
wrought boundaries between medicine and poison to “offend [a] deep-
rooted sensibility” essential to human health.90 For many primitive socie-
ties, only dangerous and unfamiliar mysticism could provide an explanation 
of poisons’ effects. 
Further cause for the poison ban surely relates to its inhumane effects. 
Historical accounts of battlefield deaths by poison relate extreme suffering. 
A history of Alexander the Great’s campaign in India describes the deaths 
of invaders wounded by the swords of defenders of the city of Harmatelia. 
 
On the king’s side, however, not a few received wounds which all but 
proved fatal, since the barbarians had anointed their steels with a deadly 
tincture . . . .  Accordingly when any one was wounded, his body at once 
became numb, and sharp pains soon succeeded, while the whole frame 
was shaken with tremblings and convulsions. The skin became cold and 
livid, and the stomach discharged bile. A foam, moreover, of a black col-
our issued from the wound and putrefied. At this stage the poison quickly 
spread to the vital parts of the body and caused a death of fearful agony. 
Those, therefore, who had been severely wounded and those who had re-
ceived nothing more than an accidental scratch suffered equally.91 
 
Many historical prohibitions of poison appear primarily concerned with 
assassination rather than large-scale tactical or operational use.92 Objections 
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to poison often relate, as will be shown with respect to other weapons, to 
its potential to enable a weak or under-empowered adversary to upset an 
established order favoring the strong.93 Poison has shown great potential to 
convert matches of strength and resources into contests of betrayal and 
exploitation. The disruptive effect of poison is confirmed by its frequent 
use as a literary tool capable of arousing tragic pity and venal hatred.94  
Despite nearly universally professed distaste for its use and subjection 
to legal proscription, poison has seen intermittent use in warfare.95 Profes-
sor Gillespie catalogs uses of poisons by ancient and pre-modern armies 
spanning centuries and cultures, including Greeks, Carthaginians, Romans, 
Indians, Saracens, English, Spanish and French.96 Means of delivery have 
included edged weapons, projectiles, wine, water, fumes and, most distress-
ingly but perhaps implausibly, vishakanyas or “poisonous damsels”—
“female courtesans who from early childhood were given doses of poison-
ous herbs or the venom of snakes and scorpions. By the time they reached 
adolescence, although they themselves had become immunised, they were 
deadly poisonous to those who had contact with them, especially intimate 
contact.”97 
Breaches and myths notwithstanding, it is perhaps not surprising that 
poison has attracted a consistent and pervasive record of legal condemna-
tion. Unequivocal poison prohibitions featured prominently in nearly all 
the major law of war works preceding the Hague Peace Conferences, as 
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well as the regulations of land warfare those conferences produced.98 Elicit-
ing objections on the basis of suffering, indiscriminateness, treachery, so-
cial disruption, resistance to medical treatment, and perhaps even human 
genetic predisposition and human evolutionary adaptation, few weapons 
seem to have combined so many sources of opposition as poison. 
 
B. Crossbow  
 
One of the most familiar historical weapons bans relates to the crossbow. 
The crossbow emerged in the third century B.C. and proliferated in armies, 
primarily for use by relatively untrained and lower classes of armed forces.99 
Later models, especially those using a steel rather than wooden bow, greatly 
improved the ease of use and penetrating power of the traditional bow.100 
By the eleventh century, a crossbow bolt could reliably pierce the armor of 
the best-equipped knight.101 By the late twelfth century and until the four-
teenth century the crossbow was “the dominant handheld missile weapon 
in most of western Europe.”102  
It is widely reported that in 1139 Pope Innocent II at the Second Lat-
eran Council first attempted to ban the use of the crossbow in war.103 Ac-
                                                                                                                  
98. See 1863 Lieber Code, supra note 75, art. 16; 1874 Brussels Declaration, supra note 
13, art. 12; OXFORD MANUAL, supra note 82, art. 8(a); 1899 Hague Regulations, supra note 
82, art. 23(a). 
99. STEPHEN SELBY, CHINESE ARCHERY 154 (2000). 
100. RALPH PAYNE-GALLWEY, THE BOOK OF THE CROSSBOW 31–37 (Toronto: 
General Publishing Company, 1995) (1903). The comparative merits of the crossbow and 
longbow have been debated for centuries. The English preference for the longbow mani-
fested itself in domestic law which for centuries prohibited crossbow ownership so as not 
to degrade from the yeomanry’s skill with the longbow. Id. at 34 (citing Parliamentary Acts 
of 1508, 1512, 1515, 1537 and 1542). 
101. Id. at 19. 
102. Id. at 4; David S. Bachrach, Crossbows for the King: The Crossbow during the Reigns of 
John and Henry II of England, 45 TECHNOLOGY & CULTURE 102, 102 (2004). 
103. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
9 (2009); Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff trace a Papal ban on the crossbow and arba-
lest to a Lateran Council of 1132 rather than 1139. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, 
supra note 76, at 53. 
Canon 29 of the Second Lateran Council states, “We forbid under penalty of anathe-
ma that that deadly and God-detested art of slingers and archers be in the future exercised 
against Christians and Catholics.” A commentary on the Second Lateran Council Canon 
appears to challenge the standard account of the Council’s treatment of the crossbow. The 
commentary surmises that Canon 29 actually referred to a practice of wagering on archery 













counts indicate the Council concurred that the crossbow was “deadly and 
odious to God.”104 Bows and other projectile weapons had been discredited 
far earlier than the Middle Ages. Greek and other ancient societies often 
scorned the bow and javelin as inconsistent with honorable warfare and 
agreed to prohibit their use in some conflicts.105 Later, German Emperor 
Conrad III reportedly banned the crossbow’s use and made its use punish-
able by death.106   
But the crossbow posed much more than a mere tactical threat. Level-
ing the battlefield between elite, mounted warriors of the nobility and large-
ly untrained, amateur conscripts, the crossbow was feared to have revolu-
tionary effects on established political, military and social orders. Historians 
note the crossbow’s important contributions to shifting meta-trends in 
warfare. It is thought that a crossbow killed the English king Richard the 
Lionheart, but its disruptive effects date to even earlier times.107 The first 
episodes of true warfare are thought to have involved periodic invasions by 
mounted nomads against sedentary agrarians.108 For centuries tactical ad-
vantage rested decisively with the mounted raider. The crossbow later af-
forded agrarian peoples a means of defense at once effective and easily 
employed, shifting military hegemony away from mounted, professional 
warrior classes of nomadic peoples such as the Mongols, in favor of stable 
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and sedentary populations like the Chinese, Byzantine and European civili-
zations.109 
As a testament to its effectiveness and the weakness of extant weapons 
law, orders to develop new crossbow technology and widespread deploy-
ment of crossbows post-date most efforts to eliminate use of the weapon. 
By the fourteenth century, the crossbow’s place in the arsenals of Europe 
was cemented.110 Castle owners required tenants and soldiers to own cross-
bows.111 Some cities mandated crossbow ownership as a requirement of 
citizenship. Even the nobility seems to have warmed to them, reportedly 
making frequent diplomatic gifts of crossbows.112  
Therefore, despite moral, religious and even strong political objections, 
efforts to ban lawful use of the crossbow largely represent a legislative fail-
ure.113 Its enormous effectiveness and widespread deployment secured its 
place despite mild and selective notoriety. The crossbow offered little to 
justify its prohibition other than its potentially disruptive effect on estab-
lished military hegemony and order. Ultimately, it seems only technological 
advance itself, through the development of gunpowder and firearms could 
eliminate the crossbow from the battlefield.  
 
C. Firearms and Bullets  
 
Mindful of the battlefield disruption and threats to long-established com-
batant hierarchies posed by the crossbow, sovereigns resorted to weapons 
law to regulate firearms as well.114 Perhaps no means of warfare has a histo-
ry of regulation as long, as complicated and as controversial as that of small 
arms bullets. Yet efforts to regulate bullets have met with only sporadic 
success and, over time, the positions of even initially successful regulations 
seem to have become less secure. 
Surely motivated to preserve established social order, States sought first 
to restrict use of firearms to the nobility.115 The emperor of Japan, eager to 
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preserve the culture and status of his elite samurai warrior class, imposed 
an early government monopoly on firearms to ensure they would all be de-
stroyed.116  
Later attempts to regulate firearms evolved to address concerns beyond 
sustaining elite hegemonies. By the mid-nineteenth century a growing sense 
of humanity and alarm at unnecessary suffering caused by new bullet de-
signs led private organizations and even States to seek international regula-
tions. In 1863, Russian engineers developed a small caliber exploding bullet 
designed for use against ammunition wagons.117 By 1867, engineers modi-
fied these bullets to explode on impact with soft tissue such as the human 
body.118 Although militaries also employed them for benign uses, such as 
range finding in mountainous regions,119 use against persons reportedly 
prompted Russian Tsar Alexander II to propose a conference to form a 
treaty renouncing the use of lightweight, exploding projectiles.120 The pre-
vailing thinking at the conference was that bullets designed to explode on 
contact with human tissue inflicted suffering greater than that required to 
put targeted soldiers out of combat.121 
The Tsar’s conference produced in relatively short order the 1868 St. 
Petersburg Declaration.122 By the Declaration’s terms, the parties agreed 
“to renounce, in case of war among themselves, the employment by their 
military or naval troops of any projectile of a weight below 400 grammes, 
which is either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable sub-
stances.”123 Through signature and eventual accession, nineteen States 
joined the treaty, including many major military powers.124  
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Three decades after the 1868 Declaration and again at the invitation of 
a Russian Tsar, this time Nicholas II, States met to consider further law of 
war limitations on bullets. At the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, in addi-
tion to a convention and regulations on the general law of land warfare, 
States produced a declaration prohibiting use of bullets that flatten easily in 
the human body.125 Manufactured with an exposed tip or with incisions on 
the outer hard jacket to permit a soft lead core to expand on impact, so-
called dum-dum bullets were designed to increase stopping power and 
produced greatly aggravated wounds.126 Persuaded by arguments that bullet 
expansion needlessly intensified suffering, the majority of States present at 
the Hague expressed early support during the conference for a ban on ex-
panding bullets. 
The United Kingdom, paired with the United States, led efforts to 
preempt the Hague prohibition. The Anglo powers, the UK in particular, 
argued that expanding bullets were essential to counter fanatical native re-
sistance in colonial possessions.127 Anglo-American representatives also 
contested the scientific and practical bases for the prohibition, insisting 
States would simply adopt larger calibers to compensate for the loss of 
stopping power. The Declaration went forward, however, and provided, 
“The contracting Parties agree to abstain from the use of bullets which ex-
pand or flatten easily in the human body.”128 Most major military powers 
joined the 1899 Declaration with ratifications, accessions and successions 
extending to as late as 1978, including the UK in 1907, but never the Unit-
ed States.129 
Whether concern for humanity and prevention of superfluous injury 
actually motivated all the parties to the St. Petersburg and Hague Declara-
tions is debatable.130 With respect to the 1899 Declaration, humanitarian 
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motives are undermined somewhat by the parties’ agreement to ban use 
only in armed conflict among themselves.131 Under the Declaration, State 
parties were free to use expanding bullets in conflicts with non-State parties 
and even in conflicts with one another should a non-State party join either 
side as a belligerent.132 This limitation likely explains the UK’s later ratifica-
tion of the Declaration, given that its objections related chiefly to perceived 
requirements of colonial warfare. With respect to the 1868 Declaration, 
some speculate Russia feared an arms race involving exploding projectiles 
that it could ill afford to win.133 At minimum, the Tsar’s communications to 
European powers, bemoaning the costs of funding the then-prevailing state 
of armed peace, support the theory.134  
Notwithstanding occasional additions of new State parties throughout 
the twentieth century, the legacies of the 1899 Expanding Bullets Declara-
tion and the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration are mixed and, in the case of 
the latter, quite uncertain. The legal status of the 1899 Declaration is now 
somewhat stable though not without reservation. It is widely agreed that 
general use of expanding bullets violates customary international law.135 
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States’ adherence to the prohibition seems to have been relatively strong.136 
Even the United States, a non-party to the Declaration, has indicated it 
would apply its terms to international armed conflicts.137 Exceptions to the 
prohibition likely exist for circumstances where expanding bullets’ tenden-
cy not to over-penetrate an intended target would result in a more humane 
outcome, such as in hostage rescue situations, or where use of an open 
tipped bullet would enhance long-range accuracy and thereby reduce the 
risk of collateral damage.138  
The legal status of the 1868 Declaration is considerably less clear. Ex-
perts and NGOs offer a wide range of conclusions.139 By the early 1920s 
State practice and draft rules for air combat seemed to relax the ban on use 
of explosive bullets. Draft rules for air warfare permitted use of explosive 
projectiles “by or against aircraft” even for parties to the 1868 Declara-
tion.140 Later, a dispute concerning development of exploding 12.7 millime-
ter rounds, which clearly fell within the relevant 400 gram weight re-
striction, also seemed to call the reach of the Declaration into question.141 
A number of States developed and widely deployed exploding small arms 
projectiles in this period for use against lightly armored vehicles. By design, 
these rounds explode upon impact with hard surfaces to augment penetra-
tion and also to inflict concussion and fragmentation injuries on vehicle 
occupants. States that had fielded these rounds determined their design for 
anti-materiel use rather than anti-personnel use exempted them from the 
Declaration, as well as from any customary norm.142 As perhaps a further 
reflection of recent State opinion with respect to the Declaration’s ban, the 
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ICC Statute does not include use of exploding, small caliber munitions in 
its list of war crimes subject to the Court’s jurisdiction, whereas expanding 
bullets are included.143 Academic commentaries have also raised substantial 
questions concerning the continued force and customary status of the 1868 
Declaration.144 
The ICRC concluded recently, however, that anti-personnel use of ex-
ploding bullets constitutes a customary international law of war violation.145 
In a brief and selective response to the ICRC study, the United States ve-
hemently rejected the conclusion that customary international law prohibit-
ed all anti-personnel use of explosive rounds.146 The U.S. view appears only 
to prohibit projectiles designed specifically (and perhaps exclusively) to ex-
plode in the human body.147 At present, it may be safest to conclude that 
only rounds specifically designed or employed to explode on contact with 
human tissue are covered by customary international law equivalent to the 
1868 Declaration.148 State parties to the Declaration are possibly subject to 
the stricter rule in combat between themselves, banning explosive projec-
tiles simply by reference to weight rather than intended target, although 
there is evidence that State practice may have carved out an exception for 
anti-materiel uses.149 
In somewhat recent chapters of the international effort to regulate 
small arms projectiles, the United Nations sponsored meetings preparatory 
to a Second Review Conference to the 1980 Convention on Certain Con-
ventional Weapons in 1997 1999, and 2001.150 These efforts attempted to 
address small caliber bullets more directly through the Convention’s Article 
8 review conference procedures. Initial meetings intended to lead to an Ar-
ticle 8 conference proposed deliberate and scientific examination of bullet 
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wounds, including establishing an international wound ballistics testing fa-
cility. State representatives at these meetings, however, rejected the pro-
posal, as well as inclusion of a small caliber bullet provision on the Second 
Review Conference agenda.151 
In sum, experience with regulating small arms projectiles has met a fate 
largely similar to that of earlier efforts with respect to the crossbow. Initial 
desire to regulate small arms to prevent disruption to existing political and 
military hegemonies did not prove an adequate basis to support law of war 
regulation. Nor could initial notoriety muster sufficient inertia to generate 
significant international regulation. The effectiveness—and later wide-scale 
deployment of firearms and their various projectiles—proved firearms and 
their projectiles to be exceptionally regulation resistant. Although colorable 
arguments and demonstrable success were made concerning some bullets 
with respect to unnecessary suffering and complications associated with 
medical treatment, States have increasingly strained against even limits as 
deep-rooted and longstanding as the 1868 and 1899 Declarations. Current-
ly, the ban of the former is widely regarded as obsolete, while the latter op-





Although early submarines did not employ novel weapons—surface ships 
mounted most of the same guns and torpedoes—their introduction to war-
fare rapidly attracted international legal attention.153 By the early twentieth 
century, after repeated failed efforts to control submarine production, se-
lect States resolved to develop limitations on their use. Specifically, a con-
tingent of States led by the United Kingdom sporadically supported by the 
United States, proposed rules for the use of submarines against merchant 
shipping. Ultimately however, submarines proved exceptionally resistant to 
specific regulations and today operate under few, if any, regulations other 
than those generally applicable to all weapons. 
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Framed and shepherded through debates by U.S. delegate Elihu Root, 
early rules on the use of submarines against merchant shipping featured 
prominently at the 1922 Washington Naval Conference. Root’s rules, ulti-
mately codified in the conference’s draft submarine treaty, at Article 1 stat-
ed,  
 
A merchant vessel must be ordered to stop for visit and search to deter-
mine its character before it can be seized. A merchant vessel must not be 
attacked unless it refuses to submit to visit and search after warning or to 
proceed as directed after seizure. A merchant vessel must not be de-
stroyed unless the crew and passengers have been first placed in safety.154 
 
The article then provided, “if a submarine cannot capture a merchant ves-
sel in conformity with these rules . . . [it must] desist from attack . . . and 
permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested.”155  
Limiting submarines’ operations had long enjoyed support in the form 
of public opinion. Parks relates that the American delegation to the Wash-
ington Naval Conference received 400,000 letters and telegrams calling for 
restraints on submarines compared to 4,000 supporting free use of subma-
rines.156 Still, the impracticable requirements of the Washington Conference 
rules were immediately apparent to States’ representatives. States also iden-
tified ambiguity concerning the scope of vessels regarded as merchants as a 
source of concern and the draft treaty never entered force.157 
Undeterred, submarine antagonists revisited the subject at the 1930 
London Naval Conference. Citing interests of humanity, but also motivat-
ed by their desire to guard their still-significant surface fleet, the British 
hosts argued for a complete ban on submarines.158 While the conference 
saw the United States reverse course to favor the ban, other States—
especially Japan—were opposed. As an alternative, the British representa-
                                                                                                                  
154. Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare art. 1, 
Feb. 6, 1922, 25 L.N.T.S. 202, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13, 
at 1139 [hereinafter Submarines and Gases Treaty]. 
155. Id. 
156. W. Hays Parks, Making Law of War Treaties: Lessons from Submarine Warfare Regula-
tion, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR 
OF PROFESSOR L.C. GREEN ON THE OCCASION OF HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 339, 348 
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2000) (Vol. 75, U.S. Naval War College International Law Stud-
ies) [hereinafter Parks, Lessons]. 
157. Id. at 351. 












tives proposed a resurrection of the 1922 submarine treaty draft rules.159 
The Conference adopted the rules, but they saw limited ratification and 
only mild enthusiasm for implementation, especially in Japan.160 By 1936, 
Japan announced its withdrawal from the London Treaty. 
Despite Japanese withdrawal, the United States and Britain led a second 
London Naval Conference in 1936. The second conference produced a 
Procés-Verbal to the 1930 Treaty of London which stated in the relevant 
part,  
 
except in the case of a persistent refusal to stop on being summoned, or 
of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or 
submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant 
vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship’s papers in a 
place of safety.161 
 
Although more widely ratified, the 1936 Procés-Verbal proved ineffective 
at regulating submarine warfare during the Second World War. No major 
naval power adhered to its provisions.162 Contempt for the Procés-Verbal 
even extended to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, where 
the Tribunal awarded no punishment to German Navy Chief Karl Dönitz, 
despite adjudging technical convictions for violations of its rules against 
him.163 
Parks offers a number of insightful observations concerning the Procés-
Verbal. First, he attributes failure of the Procés-Verbal submarine rules to 
their adoption in place of failed arms control efforts. Clearly intended to 
render submarines obsolete, the rules attempted to achieve through hu-
manitarian regulation what could not be achieved through arms control. 
Second, he characterizes its rules as a disingenuous effort to alter strategic 
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and operational balances of power and arms through law of war regula-
tion.164 This second observation, concerning disruption, fits similarly failed 
efforts with respect to the crossbow and early firearms regulations. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, Parks notes that international law regulation 
of submarines may have been doomed to failure all along because they 
were such an effective means of warfare.165 Their wide-scale deployment by 
the Second World War, as well as the unprecedented access they offered to 
the vulnerabilities of the world’s surface fleet, surely contributed to their 
regulation resistance as well. 
 
E. The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
 
In 1968, an international conference on human rights held in Tehran166 
sparked not only several years of the most intense law of war development 
in modern history, it also ignited a brief turf war concerning sponsorship of 
law of war development. Inspired by the Tehran conference, the UN Gen-
eral Assembly invited the Secretary-General to study the “need for addi-
tional humanitarian international conventions and rules.”167 In response, 
and clearly anxious to preserve its traditional role in law of war develop-
ment, the ICRC initiated a competing series of meetings of its own. Fol-
lowing the UN and ICRC meetings, and what was for practical purposes a 
twenty-five-year hiatus on law of war treaty development, States formally 
met in 1974 to consider amendments and additions to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.168 After significant wrangling, States declined to address the 
topic of weapons regulation at the ICRC-sponsored diplomatic confer-
ences that produced the 1977 Additional Protocols. But agreement 
emerged simultaneously to address weapons separately, under UN auspi-
ces.169  
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A series of meetings of government experts attempted to identify 
common ground between States concerning the regulation of conventional 
weapons and to study technical and medical issues.170 These meetings 
proved to be a broad effort to identify opportunities for progress in the 
regulation of weapons. Their labors eventually produced the important, but 
clumsily named 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscrimi-
nate Effects (CCW).171 The CCW addresses specific weapons States deem 
to be inconsistent with the fundamental law of war principles of discrimi-
nation and unnecessary suffering.  
The CCW envisions an iterative, open-ended procedure for amend-
ment and expansion. In fact, the base CCW actually contains no substan-
tive rules concerning weapons. Instead, Article 8 permits State parties to 
convene periodically to consider protocols respecting categories of weap-
ons or to amend existing CCW protocols on specific weapons.172 Simple 
majorities are insufficient to add new protocols to the CCW regime—all 
State parties to the CCW must join in consensus to add a protocol. While 
onerous, the consensus requirement has been an important, if controver-
sial, facet of the CCW process since its formative meetings and confer-
ences.173 
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Although a fifteen-year gap intervened between conclusion of the orig-
inal CCW conference and its first Article 8 review conference, the CCW 
review process has been one of the most active in the history of the law of 
war.174 Following the first review conference, held in 1996, the CCW State 
parties resolved to hold subsequent review conferences every five years.175 
The CCW now includes comprehensive weapons bans on both non-
detectable fragments and blinding lasers, as well as two protocols that 
greatly restrict use of landmines and incendiaries and a protocol outlining 
significant responsibilities with respect to weapons that produce unexplod-
ed remnants. Still, the record of success at the CCW remains mixed. To 
date the CCW process has debated, but failed to achieve consensus on a 
number of other weapons, including small caliber bullets, fuel-air explo-
sives, high-velocity flechettes, cluster munitions and, most recently, lethal 
autonomous weapons.176 
 
F. Non-detectable Fragments 
 
The first of the three original CCW protocols addressed to a specific con-
ventional weapon, the Protocol on Non-detectable Fragments states in its 
entirety, “It is prohibited to use any weapon the primary effect of which is 
to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-
rays.”177 The de minimus costs to military advantage and the humanitarian 
benefits of banning a weapon have perhaps never been so obvious as with 
respect to non-detectable fragments. Non-detectable fragments, such as 
glass, greatly frustrate established medical protocols for treatment of trau-
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ma wounds, requiring invasive exploratory surgery to locate and treat. In 
this respect, non-detectable fragments continue to inflict additional wounds 
and suffering even after the victim has been rendered hors de combat, evacu-
ated from the battlefield and begun medical treatment. Few weapons seem 
so clearly to inflict unnecessary suffering as non-detectable fragments, alt-
hough CCW Protocol I does not explicitly memorialize a conclusion to this 
effect.  
Accounts of the CCW process do not record significant disagreement 
or difficulties achieving consensus with respect to the non-detectable frag-
ments ban. The Protocol has 115 State parties, many of whom are militarily 
significant, and appears to enjoy a relatively successful record of implemen-
tation and observance.178 Non-detectable fragments are not known to have 





The CCW process also presented States an opportunity to address the hu-
manitarian plague of landmines.179 In addition to their unintended effects 
on civilians, landmines initially offended senses of military honor by their 
reliance on surprise, deception and, most characteristically, victim activa-
tion rather than direct confrontation.180 It is well known that mines have 
produced tragic and widespread casualties among civilian populations, es-
pecially during and after conflicts involving their indiscriminate use. Mines 
have also produced particularly gruesome wounds, requiring amputations 
of lower limbs and inflicting heinous wounds to the genital and abdomen 
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areas. Furthermore, mine wounds are known to exact a high mortality rate 
and when not fatal often result in permanent disability.181  
The first militarily significant use of anti-personnel landmines as the 
term is understood today dates to the American Civil War. The Confeder-
ate Army is reported to have altered artillery shells to explode by being 
stepped on.182 Estimates indicate that both sides deployed fewer than 
20,000 mines. Yet, one hundred years after the conflict, Civil War-era 
mines were discovered in a live condition in the American South.183 Mine 
warfare proliferated greatly during the Second World War, with deploy-
ments numbering in the hundreds of millions.184 The Korean and Vietnam 
conflicts also involved significant use of mines, with the United States mak-
ing use of remotely-delivered mines scattered by aircraft or projectiles in 
the latter conflict.185 Accurate estimates of the number of uncleared 
landmines have proved somewhat elusive. Studies motivated by political 
and financial goals have been proved to include drastic overestimations.186 
Yet reports of casualties from mines are irrefutably grave, with reliable an-
nual estimates running to more than ten thousand.187 
Interestingly, responsible military doctrine considers landmines primari-
ly as a means of countermobility operations, as opposed to casualty genera-
tors. In tactical and operational terms, mines are most effective when de-
ployed to prevent or slow enemy maneuver rather than to directly generate 
casualties or achieve general attrition, although they have frequently been 
used simply to harass enemy activity, especially by irregular forces.188 For 
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instance, landmines (anti-vehicle mines in particular) can be used to chan-
nelize enemy forces into direct fire engagement areas or to slow their pro-
gress through such zones, providing greater opportunities for defenders to 
fire on targets.189 Refined military doctrine instructs forces to watch over 
mines to inflict direct-fire casualties or by calling for indirect fire, such as 
artillery or mortars, against enemy forces blocked or slowed by attempts to 
breach the minefield.190 Additionally, by slowing enemy advance and in-
creasing advancing forces’ exposure time in engagement areas, landmines 
can greatly reduce the number of defenders required to hold a broad front. 
Initial thoughts concerning regulation considered development of in-
ternational marking requirements for minefields. Obligations to post signs 
or symbols and a duty to hand over maps indicating locations of mines 
were considered at various times in the history of efforts to regulate 
them.191 Although the original CCW diplomatic conference considered the 
possibility of a ban on anti-personnel landmines, States were unable to 
achieve any sort of consensus on this point. 192 Other regulatory efforts 
sought to limit means of landmine dispersal. A 1974 proposal considered 
banning air delivery of mines to reduce indiscriminate effects, and discus-
sions included rocket or missile delivery as well.193 
Rather than ban anti-personnel landmines, the CCW process produced 
two instruments regulating their use. The first was Protocol II on the Use 
of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices.194 According to reports, draft-
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ing of CCW Protocol II proved non-contentious.195 Rather than resort to 
purely humanitarian innovations, the Protocol’s requirements derived large-
ly from emerging military doctrine requiring marking and recording of 
minefields.196 The majority of the Protocol’s substantive provisions address 
indiscriminate deployment of mines and it includes a number of prohibi-
tions and precautions intended to spare civilians from the effects of mine 
operations.197 For example, the Protocol greatly limits placement of mines 
in or near areas populated by civilians.198 It also requires that the locations 
of remotely delivered mines be recorded and that they include neutralizing 
devices to render them harmless or destroy them when they no longer 
serve a military purpose.199  
The Protocol also regulates booby traps, which include “an apparently 
harmless portable object which is specifically designed and constructed to 
contain explosive material and to detonate when it is disturbed or ap-
proached.”200 As a supplement to existing rules on perfidy and treachery, 
the Protocol forbids placement of booby traps among protected symbols 
and facilities such as medical installations, or associating booby traps with 
items routinely required by the civilian population such as food, children’s 
items and religious objects.201 Finally, States included elaborate recording 
requirements for minefields and booby traps and a duty to remove mine-
fields “after the cessation of active hostilities.”202 
Preparatory meetings to generate updates and amendments to CCW 
Protocol II began in Geneva in 1994, with a formal CCW Article 8 Review 
Conference held in Vienna in 1995 and another in 1996. These ultimately 
produced Amended CCW Protocol II, which expanded CCW application 
to non-international armed conflicts, addressed remotely-delivered mines in 
greater detail, provided for detectability standards, and added provisions 
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addressing anti-handling devices affixed to mines and self-deactivation re-
quirements.203  
Despite their success in generating amendments, the 1995 and 1996 
Review Conferences competed for attention and adherents with a simulta-
neous effort to ban landmines altogether led by the International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines, a network of NGOs formed in 1992.204 The effort, 
supported also by the ICRC and a number of States, drew heavily on per-
ceptions of public conscience against landmines, especially against their 
effects on civilian populations. In 1996, the Canadian government hosted a 
conference in Ottawa beginning a process to ban anti-personnel mines 
through a treaty. The effort culminated at an Oslo meeting where States 
produced the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Pro-
duction and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,205 
which was later signed by 122 States in Ottawa in December 1997. The 
Convention now has 162 State parties.206 A number of militarily significant 
States, however, have not ratified or acceded to the Convention, including 
China, India, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea and the 
United States. 
The Ottawa Convention represents one of the most thorough weapons 
regulations ever devised by States. Parties to the Convention have agreed 
not only to refrain from using landmines, but also never to “develop, pro-
duce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or 
indirectly, anti-personnel mines.”207 The Convention also addresses parties’ 
interactions with other States’ military operations by forbidding parties to 
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“assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity 
prohibited to a State Party under [the] Convention.”208 
Efforts to regulate and to prohibit anti-personnel mines have been 
complicated, implicating nearly the full range of humanitarian and other 
considerations that have informed law of war regulation of weapons. Exist-
ing landmine provisions appear to manifest consideration of all three prin-
ciples of the law of war, as well as taking into account considerable nega-
tive public opinion, stigma and notoriety. While certainly symbolic advanc-
es for the effort to expand law of war treatment of specific weapons, on 
deeper reflection, the CCW Protocols on mines (in contrast to the Ottawa 
Convention) seem to add very little that scrupulous adherence to the gen-
eral law of war principle of discrimination would not already have achieved. 
Despite seemingly legitimate claims concerning their military effectiveness 
and wide deployment, States committed to preserving the lawfulness of 
anti-personnel landmines seem increasingly tolerant of limits on their resort 
to them, if only as a matter of policy.209  
 
H. Incendiary Weapons 
 
The military value and effectiveness of incendiaries has been deeply debat-
ed. They have been used with great effect on entrenched troops, especially 
against determined defenders in bunkers, caves and other fortifications. 
Flamethrowers and other projecting incendiary weapons can reach around 
confined corners and through obstacles or openings in ways that few other 
weapons can.  
The chief characteristic of incendiaries, however, may be their psycho-
logical effect.210 Burn wounds produce severe pain and require intensive 
medical care to treat. Death from burns may occur long after wound inflic-
tion. Some types of incendiaries, such as napalm, produce more serious 
burns than others. In addition to burns, other incendiaries, such as white 
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phosphorous, introduce toxins and consume sufficient oxygen in confined 
spaces to result in asphyxiation.211 
Given their grave capacity to injure, it is not surprising that weapons 
law history is replete with efforts to regulate incendiary weapons. At the 
1932—34 League of Nations Disarmament Conference, the United King-
dom proposed a draft convention to forbid the use, production and stock-
piling of incendiary weapons, including flamethrowers.212 The proposal re-
portedly attracted universal support among the States represented, howev-
er, the ban never entered force after the general failure of the Conference.  
The widespread destruction and human suffering caused by use of in-
cendiary bombs during the Second World War and especially the use of 
napalm in later conflicts ultimately inspired renewed attention. A 1956 
ICRC proposal even classified incendiaries alongside nuclear, chemical and 
bacteriological agents as weapons whose effects could not be controlled 
sufficiently to protect civilian populations.213 Attention to incendiaries be-
came quite intense by the early 1970s with a significant number of States 
advocating a ban on their use, especially in anti-personnel engagements.214 
States finally addressed the use of incendiaries in Protocol III to the 
1980 CCW. As with anti-personnel landmines, some States and organiza-
tions sought to ban the use of incendiaries, yet Protocol III merely restricts 
their use. Article 2(2) provides, “It is prohibited in all circumstances to 
make any military objective within a concentration of civilians the object of 
attack by air-delivered incendiary weapons.”215 Article 2(3) addresses use of 
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incendiaries delivered by means other than air, prohibiting their use against 
military objectives except when they are “clearly separated” from concen-
trations of civilians and when precautions are taken to protect civilians and 
civilian objects from the effects of their use.216 
Examination of Protocol III’s substantive limits demonstrates that the 
Protocol is best understood as a manifestation and refinement of the prin-
ciple of discrimination rather than of unnecessary suffering. Civilians, ra-
ther than combatants, appear to be the primary beneficiaries of the Proto-
col. Had it been intended to address unnecessary suffering, one would have 
expected provisions limiting or even prohibiting incendiary use against 
combatants. That the Protocol includes no such limits leaves the law of war 
principle of unnecessary suffering itself the only limit on their use against 
combatants, greatly undermining arguments that incendiary use involves 
unnecessary suffering per se. While undoubtedly an improvement in gen-
eral humanitarian terms, the Protocol is evidence of States’ view of the 
continued military effectiveness of incendiaries despite strong medical evi-
dence of inflicting high degrees of human suffering and their seemingly 
reduced deployment. 
 
I. Blinding Lasers 
 
At the First CCW Review Conference, convened nearly fifteen years after 
the base CCW treaty and first three protocols were completed, the CCW 
parties added a protocol to ban blinding lasers. Protocol IV prohibits use 
and transfer of “laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat 
function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness 
to unenhanced vision . . . .”217 The Blinding Lasers Protocol is a rare in-
stance of States agreeing to ban a weapon in advance of its deployment.218  
There are 104 State parties to the Protocol, including a high number of 
militarily significant States. Consent to be bound by the Protocol pro-
gressed somewhat slowly after its entry into force in 1998. Nearly a third of 
the current State parties joined the Protocol more than five years after 
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that.219 Militarily significant States not party to Protocol IV include Afghan-
istan, Algeria, Central African Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sudan, Syria, 
Uganda, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela.220 
Like its predecessor concerning non-detectable fragments, the Blinding 
Lasers Protocol is by modern standards an exceedingly brief and seemingly 
unambiguous law of war instrument.221 Its brevity and clarity mask, howev-
er, the somewhat contested nature of its development and adoption. Ef-
forts to regulate or ban blinding lasers actually preceded the CCW review 
conferences by more than two decades.222 At the original CCW proceed-
ings, States rejected a ban on blinding lasers proposed by Sweden.223 Re-
sistance to the ban stemmed from disagreement whether blinding by laser 
inflicted unnecessary suffering, and fear that a ban on blinding lasers might 
impact other laser use on the modern battlefield,224 which includes target 
designation, range finding and even destructive functions.225  
By the mid-to-late 1980s States and international organizations har-
bored sufficient concern regarding the blinding effects of lasers to provoke 
a series of ICRC and UN conferences to reinvestigate the feasibility of in-
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ternational regulation.226 Some studies emphasized the gruesome physical 
process by which lasers inflict blindness. Laser damage to eyes can report-
edly occur by vaporizing water in eye tissue into steam, by heating tissue to 
temperatures sufficient to cook the eye or even by generating plasma that 
harnesses sufficient energy to induce an explosion in the eye.227 Not all 
considerations leading to the conclusion that blinding lasers caused unnec-
essary suffering related to physical injury. One account of a blinding by la-
ser is particularly repugnant and relates well the potential for psychological 
suffering: “When the beam struck my eye, I heard a distinct popping sound 
caused by a laser-induced explosion at the back of my eyeball. My vision 
was obscured almost immediately by streams of blood.”228 Studies also em-
phasized “a devastating and immediate effect on military morale” from 
blinding lasers.229 Eyesight is regarded as the most important of human 
senses, a finding buttressed by instinctive human reactions to protect the 
eyes during traumatic events and crises.230 Still other studies suggested that 
long-term and permanent blindness inflict severe, life-long psychological 
suffering.231 Similar studies expressed great concern for the social costs of 
supporting blinded war veterans.232  
Considering the total ban on combat use of blinding lasers, as opposed 
to mere limitations on use, it may not be too great a stretch to conclude 
that a determination regarding unnecessary suffering motivated many 
States’ support for the Protocol. Some might go so far as to conclude 
blinding laser use constitutes unnecessary suffering per se.  
                                                                                                                  
226. See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, BLINDING 
WEAPONS: REPORTS OF THE MEETINGS OF EXPERTS CONVENED BY THE ICRC ON BAT-
TLEFIELD LASER WEAPONS 1989–1991 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1993) [hereinafter 
ICRC, BLINDING WEAPONS]. 
227. Bengt Anderberg, Ove E. Bring & Myron L Wolbarsht, Blinding Laser Weapons 
and International Humanitarian Law, 29 JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH 287, 290–91(1992). 
228. Jack H. McCall Jr., Blinded by the Light: International Law and the Legality of Anti-Optic 
Laser Weapons, 30 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 1 (1997) (quoting a recount-
ing of a researcher’s accidental blinding by a laboratory laser in William Arkin, Ban Tactical 
Laser Weapons: DoD Maintains Blinding is Not Violation of War, DEFENSE NEWS, July 17–23, 
1995, at 20). 
229. McCall, supra note 228, at 291. 
230. Id. at 294. 
231. R. DeVour, Possible Psychological and Societal Effects of Sudden Permanent Blindness of 
Military Personnel Caused by Battlefield Use of Laser Weapons, in ICRC, BLINDING WEAPONS, 
supra note 226, at 46, 47. 
232. D. Warren, Psychological Effects of Total Permanent Blindness Occurring in Early Adult-












While the record indicates a contentious process of negotiation, it is 
possible that on careful consideration States concluded that lasers designed 
and employed specifically to blind do not offer sufficient military advantage 
to justify the documented suffering and social costs of their effects on hu-
mans. In this regard, as a line-of-sight, direct-fire weapon, lasers do not 
seem to offer significant military advantage, novel access to enemy vulner-
abilities or effectiveness greater than other direct-fire weapons. It is true 
that lasers are much less, if at all, susceptible to trajectory effects from 
gravity and environmental considerations such as wind, temperature and 
humidity. However, unlike incendiaries, their battlefield use did not seem 
to offer access to targets that could not be reached effectively by other 
means. That medical science offers no cure or treatment to restore the 
damage caused by blinding lasers likely contributed to their ultimate regula-
tion tolerance. Success at concluding the Protocol is also likely attributable 
to negotiators’ success at devising language to permit use of lasers for other 
purposes, such as range finding and target designation. 
 
J. Cluster Munitions 
 
The most surprising aspect of cluster munitions may not be the rapidly in-
creasing pace at which they are regulated nor their remarkable engineering, 
but rather their relatively early appearance on the battlefield. Generally 
identified as munitions that disperse multiple independent, explosive sub-
munitions, cluster munitions featured in fifteenth century design drawings 
of Leonardo da Vinci.233 They were reportedly first used by Sweden in 
1840, in the form of mortars that scattered exploding grenades.234 By the 
twentieth century, British scientists developed cluster munitions intended 
to facilitate incendiary attacks during the First World War.235 Their first 
widespread use was by German and Soviet forces in the Second World War 
against urban targets and armored forces, respectively.236 Later in the war, 
the United States used cluster munitions with incendiary submunitions 
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against Japanese cities.237 Since those pioneering uses, it is estimated cluster 
munitions have been used in at least thirty-three other armed conflicts.238  
Military doctrine recognizes that cluster munitions offer a number of 
important advantages in combat. Cluster munitions, especially those that 
are air-delivered, minimize risks to friendly forces by reducing the number 
of sorties required to apply ordnance to large military objectives.239 A single 
cluster munition, through dispersal of multiple submunitions, can cover an 
area comparable to that of dozens (or more) conventional, fragmenting 
munitions. The dispersed effects of submunitions are also effective against 
moving targets. Rather than strike the actual intended target or very near it, 
cluster munitions need only strike the general area through which a mobile 
target is moving. Cluster munitions have also proved particularly effective 
against anti-aircraft arrays, permitting pilots to avoid dangerous, low-level 
bombing runs required to accurately employ single-blast unguided 
bombs.240 
Concern for humanitarian costs of cluster munitions emerged soon af-
ter their proliferation. Active efforts to regulate or ban cluster munitions 
intensified after the United States used them extensively in the Vietnam 
War.241 High dud rates and the propensity of unexploded submunitions to 
attract attention from children led to calls to regulate cluster munitions in 
the early 1970s.242 Civilian casualty figures resulting from indiscriminate use 
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of cluster munitions and the work of NGOs generated significant negative 
opinion, similar to the campaign against anti-personnel landmines.243 It is 
believed that Israel’s 2006 use of as many as 4.6 million submunitions 
against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, resulting in perhaps 265 civilian 
deaths between 2006 and 2009 from those that failed to explode, proved a 
crucial tipping point in international efforts to ban cluster munitions.244 
By 1990, firm proposals to ban cluster munition use or to place strict 
regulations on acceptable dud rates circulated among several States.245 A 
number of States and NGOs later exercised the CCW Article 8 review pro-
cess to address humanitarian concerns associated with cluster munitions.246 
At a series of meetings and conferences, including periodic CCW review 
conferences, State parties made a number of important determinations with 
respect to regulation of cluster munitions.247 First, the CCW States resolved 
not to address cluster munitions as such, but rather through Protocol V 
regulations on unexploded ordnance in general.248 Second, States rejected a 
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number of NGO calls for CCW bans and moratoriums on use of cluster 
munitions in favor of regulations governing technical features and duties 
with respect to post-combat removal of ordnance.249 Specifically, States 
rejected calls to ban use of cluster bombs against military objectives located 
in concentrations of civilians, a provision similar to that included in the 
preceding CCW Protocol III on incendiaries.250  
Meetings convened since 2003 have considered means to further limit 
or condition use of cluster munitions, but have not yet secured consensus 
for any amendment to Protocol V nor have they worked toward a CCW 
ban on cluster munitions as some had hoped. At the Third CCW Review 
Conference, twenty-six States supported a CCW protocol addressed specif-
ically to cluster munitions, however, their proposal failed.251 Norway, dis-
satisfied with Protocol V, to the surprise of many participants in the CCW 
process proposed an international ban on cluster munitions separate from 
the CCW regime near the end of the 2006 CCW Third Review Confer-
ence.252 The Oslo Process ultimately produced the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions (CCM) concluded in 2008.253 Unlike the CCW process, the pro-
cedures used to develop the CCM did not require absolute consensus, 
though rules of procedure strongly encouraged pursuit of consensus over 
the alternative two-thirds majority rule.254  
The CCM prohibits parties to “[u]se . . . , [d]evelop, produce, otherwise 
acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster 
munitions.”255 Like the Ottawa Convention with respect to landmines, the 
CCM also regulates State parties’ actions with respect to military operations 
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of allies not party to the Convention. CCM Parties may not “assist, encour-
age or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party 
under [the] Convention.”256 Despite its quite comprehensive ban, the CCM 
includes an important provision on interoperability that proved essential to 
States’ acceptance of the Convention at its diplomatic conference in Dub-
lin. Article 21(3) provides, “Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of 
this Convention and in accordance with international law, States Parties, 
their military personnel or nations may engage in military cooperation and 
operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in 
activities prohibited to a State Party.” 
States have ratified or acceded to the CCM relatively rapidly in re-
sponse to aggressive public campaigns designed to stigmatize the use of 
cluster munitions. There are already ninety-three States party to the 
CCM.257 The list of State parties includes strong representation among 
NATO members. Notable non-party States include China, Russia, India, 
Iran, Israel, Pakistan and the United States. The conclusion and entry into 
force of the CCM has likely reduced enthusiasm for pursuing a CCW ban 
on cluster munitions; however, a number of States possessing cluster muni-
tions appeared interested in sustaining the CCW process as a means of reg-
ulation, perhaps to compete with the CCM.258 At present, their efforts have 
not met with success.259 Until these States experience significant changes of 
opinion with respect to the effectiveness of cluster munitions or a replace-
ment emerges for these widely deployed weapons, however, both ratifica-




In addition to provoking attention to incendiaries, cluster munitions and 
landmines, the Vietnam War sparked interest in regulating or banning 
flechette projectiles. After sporadic use in ancient warfare and their first 
significant use in the First World War, flechettes evolved by the mid-
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twentieth century into small dart or nail-like projectiles usually launched in 
mass quantities by an explosive charge or shell.260 Designed for anti-
personnel use, flechettes (or “beehive” rounds) were credited with the re-
pulsion of a number of determined attacks against lightly defended firebas-
es during the Vietnam War.261 They have also, however, been condemned 
as indiscriminate and capable of inflicting unnecessary suffering on com-
batants. The possibility that flechettes may deform or fragment on impact 
led to the allegation that, like expanding bullets, they cause wounds greater 
than that necessary to incapacitate combatants.262 Because of their small 
size, low weight and slim aerodynamic profile, flechettes travel at extraor-
dinarily high speed. Injuries from shock waves produced by high-speed 
impact with human tissue inspired many early objections to the use of pro-
jectiles that travel at similarly high velocity.263 It was thought by some that 
these shock waves produced injury in excess of that needed to render tar-
gets hors de combat. 
Despite these objections, efforts to ban or regulate flechettes have 
failed consistently. Efforts of the early 1970s met rejection reportedly be-
cause of the sparse use of flechettes. At the time, the United States was the 
only State to acknowledge that it had flechettes in its inventory and ex-
pressed “keen interest in retaining” them.264 Defenders of flechettes em-
phasized that any issue of indiscriminateness was attributable to improper 
use rather than to the nature of the projectiles themselves.265 Defenders 
also rejected conclusions that flechettes cause injuries more grave than oth-
er projectiles in common use.266  
Interest in regulating flechettes decreased after these early attempts, 
with flechettes attracting only sporadic mention at weapons conferences, 
including the CCW process.267 Meanwhile, flechettes failed to demonstrate 
much staying power in the weapons inventories of major powers. Despite 
their apparent utility and effectiveness, the United States phased them out 
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by the 1980s, most notably from its arsenal of tank rounds.268 It is likely 
that technical advances in cluster munitions account for the displacement 
of flechettes as favored anti-personnel weapons. At present, Israel appears 
to be the only major military power that acquires and employs flechettes in 
significant quantities.269 
 
L. Chemical Weapons 
 
Relative to efforts to regulate other weapons, enthusiasm for international 
regulation of chemical weapons emerged and became established early in 
their development.270 At the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, most States 
immediately perceived chemical weapons as substantially different from 
other weapons under consideration for regulation. Price has observed in 
addressing the agreement produced at the Conference, “The unique aspect 
of the emergent CW [chemical weapons] norm . . .  is that it did not . . . 
simply ban particular uses of such shells (e.g. against civilians), while im-
plicitly conferring legitimacy upon their use against soldiers in the field. Ra-
ther, the Hague declaration took the form of a more absolute prohibition . . 
. .”271  
States’ early enthusiasm for regulation of chemical weapons is in one 
respect surprising, yet in another respect foreseeable. The surprising aspect 
of States’ early regulation of chemical weapons is their nascent state of de-
velopment at the time. Chemical weapons, especially those delivered by 
projectile, were not widely fielded by the States which ratified the 1899 ban 
on their use. In fact, uncertainty as to their effects and military necessity led 
the United States to withhold support for the ban and subsequent regula-
tion of chemical weapons for over five decades. 
The foreseeable aspect of the early ban on chemical weapons relates to 
the inherent characteristics or nature of these weapons. Although the 
Hague conference attendees addressed them, and current law regards them 
as separate means subject to separate prohibitions, chemical weapons and 
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poison elicit many of the same human reactions.272 Defenders characterized 
early chemical attacks of the First World War as “poisonous.”273 Asserting 
similarities between poison and chemical weapons, Professor van Court-
land Moon offers this observation from a World War I memoir: 
 
You always felt this poison gas was so mean and treacherous. It wasn’t so 
much the harm it did to the body, which was always much over-estimated 
in the popular imagination, as the harm it did to the mind. A shell might 
make terrible wounds, but its burst was all over in an instant. It was a case 
of hit or miss which left no ill-will behind. But this harmless-looking, al-
most invisible, stuff would lie for days on end lurking in low places wait-
ing for the unwary. It was the Devil’s breath. It was Ahrimanic from the 
first velvety phut of the shell burst to those corpse-like breaths that a man 
inhaled almost unawares. It lingered about out of control. When he fired 
it, man released an evil force that became free to bite friend or foe till 
such time as it died into the earth.274 
 
Perceptions of chemical weapons also parallel poison in that they are 
characterized as a “weapon of the weak.”275 Often derided as “the poor 
man’s bomb,” chemical weapons have been depicted as a crude and uncivi-
lized alternative sought out by poor and technologically unsophisticated 
powers attempting to level the odds of combat with technically and mili-
tarily superior powers. Indeed, chemical weapons have been used often in 
conflicts between asymmetrically equipped forces.276 If poison was the 
weapon of choice for the disempowered seeking to displace powerful 
kings, chemical weapons represent a modern analog in their capacity to 
hamstring the most efficient and powerful armed forces.277 
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Accounts of the effectiveness of the 1899 Hague Gas Declaration vary. 
The prevailing view regards the Declaration’s ban on chemical weapons as 
a failure in light of widespread use of chemical shells by both sides in the 
First World War.278 Estimates indicate that belligerents fired as many as 
sixty-six million gas shells dispersing over 124,000 tons of chemical agents, 
affecting over one million soldiers.279 In fact, gas use in the First World 
War became so horrific that by 1918 it provoked an exceedingly rare public 
appeal from the ICRC.280  
A more nuanced view, however, notes that both sides refrained from 
use for a considerable period of the war, likely due to the influence of the 
1899 ban and the negative political discourse it provoked.281 This refined 
view suggests a stronger political and human reluctance to resort to chemi-
cal weapons then the general military history of the First World War re-
veals.  
Inspired by the horrors of First World War battlefields, States renewed 
efforts to regulate chemical weapons, first through the failed Washington 
Treaty of 1922282 and later through the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol.283 While 
the Washington agreement banned chemical warfare, the Washington con-
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ference did not manage to secure ratification of any of its work. However, 
just three years later under the League of Nations, negotiations implement-
ing the Treaty of Versailles which ended the First World War284 produced 
the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, binding parties to ban “the use in war of all 
asphyxiating, poisonous, and other gases,” as well as “bacteriological meth-
ods of warfare.”285 Parties also stipulated that the prohibition was “univer-
sally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience 
and the practice of nations.”286 
Despite the apparent universal character of the chemical weapons ta-
boo, major powers were willing to ratify the 1925 Gas Protocol only with 
significant reservations. The most important reservations limited the Pro-
tocol’s operation to conditions of reciprocal observance by other parties. 
The French government reservations are representative, providing: 
 
The said Protocol is only binding on the Government of the French Re-
public as regards States which have signed or ratified it or which may ac-
cede to it. 
 
The said Protocol shall ipso facto cease to be binding on the Government 
of the French Republic in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces 
or whose Allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Proto-
col.287 
 
Notwithstanding States’ surprising and still-unexplained forbearance 
with respect to chemical weapons during the Second World War, the 1925 
Geneva Gas Protocol and its customary law byproduct288 did not manage 
to stem resort to chemical weapons entirely.289 Substantiated allegations of 
their use have been made in the 1935 Italo-Abyssinian War, the 1937 Sino-
Japanese War, the 1963 Yemeni War and, most notably, the 1980s Iran-
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Iraq War.290 The latter two episodes of gas use, like that of the First World 
War, provoked truly exceptional public appeals from the ICRC.291 Still, 
among the hundreds of armed conflicts of the twentieth century, only six 
featured use of chemical weapons.292 
In later developments, especially at the formative stages of the 1977 
Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, States’ experts 
quickly rejected weapons of mass destruction from consideration.293 Inter-
ests of comity toward efforts already underway under UN auspices and a 
preference for promoting adoption and implementation of existing regula-
tions such as the 1925 Gas Protocol seem to have motivated the experts to 
steer clear of addressing weapons of mass destruction through the ICRC-
convened process.294 Proposals at 1972 and 1973 conferences included no 
reference to regulation of weapons of mass destruction—or any other spe-
cific weapons for that matter—although select States attempted, unsuccess-
fully, to resurrect weapons regulation during the process.295 States similarly 
rejected consideration of chemical weapons and other non-conventional 
weapons in the UN-sponsored CCW process; however, a separate negotia-
tion was soon underway. 
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With the Iran-Iraq conflict firmly in mind, States convened the 1989 
Paris Conference to strengthen and update the chemical weapons ban.296 
The Final Declaration of the conference indicated States’ eager desire to 
conclude a new convention to address chemical weapons.297 Meanwhile, a 
thawing of Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet 
Union made feasible the verification measures that many States had de-
manded precede regulation of chemical weapons beyond the first use pro-
hibited by the 1925 Gas Protocol. The Paris Conference produced interna-
tional legislative momentum that culminated in the 1993 Convention on 
Chemical Weapons (CWC).298 Reports indicate that although its develop-
ment was prolonged, the CWC was concluded with relative ease.299  
The CWC added a number of significant improvements over its prede-
cessor. First, it reiterated the customary and 1925 Protocol bans on use of 
chemical weapons, although without the State reciprocity reservations that 
had accompanied the latter’s ban.300 Second, the CWC added provisions 
that forbid State parties to “develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile 
or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical 
weapons to anyone.”301 Third, it prohibits State parties to “assist, encour-
age, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a 
State Party.”302 Lastly, the CWC obliged State parties to destroy their exist-
ing arsenals of chemical weapons and production facilities303 and included 
an elaborate regime of verification inspections.304  
Not long after the CWC took shape, States reiterated their support for 
the chemical weapons ban in the ICC Statute, which includes violation of 
the ban among war crimes subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.305 And re-
cently, reports of Syrian chemical weapons use against insurgents in the 
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current civil war have appeared in numerous media. Although Syria was 
not a State party to the CWC at the time, international concern and objec-
tions to Syrian chemical weapons stocks proved sufficiently grave to inspire 
the UN Security Council to take action, the historic Syrian-Russian alliance 
notwithstanding.306 
Despite their infrequent use and extensive production and deployment, 
chemical weapons appear capable of mustering consistent international 
condemnation—legal and political—rivaled only by poison and perhaps 
biological weapons.  
 
M. Biological and Bacteriological Weapons 
 
Long before humans developed sophisticated understandings of bacteria, 
viruses and toxins, armies appreciated the potential of incorporating bio-
logical agents and pathogens into their arsenals. Ancient practices of war-
fare included driving diseased animals into enemy lines, lacing weapons 
with feces and rotted organisms’ remains, and introducing plague and other 
diseases into enemy forces and populations.307 Even without deliberate 
human assistance, disease has long been a conspicuous feature of warfare. 
It is frequently thought that casualties of nature’s agents—cholera, typhus, 
tuberculosis, plague, malaria, influenza and the like—have outpaced those 
of manmade weapons in many conflicts.308  
A number of factors, including their affordability, ease of manufacture 
and ability to self-multiply, have made biological weapons especially worri-
some and therefore targets of regulation.309 Extraordinarily small doses of 
pathogens can result in infection.310 Once infected, a host can transmit 
communicable diseases to new hosts by any number of pathways.311 Ad-
vances in aerosol delivery added drastically to the dangers of biological 
weapons. Aerosol forms greatly decreased the amounts of pathogens need-
ed, significantly facilitated chances of infection and notably increased le-
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thality.312 Biological weapons also offer significant advantages to attackers 
given the diversity of agents, their potency, the ease of achieving surprise 
and the extreme difficulty of mounting an effective defense.313 
Although they saw no documented use in the First World War, bacte-
riological weapons received special attention from the League of Nations in 
disarmament proceedings following the war. Like poisons, biological 
weapons frustrate and erode centuries of human effort to acquire medical 
knowledge and techniques for survival. The prospect of uncontrolled epi-
demic and blowback against an attacker further fuels human revulsion of 
these weapons. They are not only by nature indiscriminate between com-
batant and civilian, but also between enemy and friend. A committee as-
signed to study special weapons concluded “bacteriological warfare ought 
to be included in qualitative disarmament . . . . It is so particularly odious 
that it revolts the conscience of humanity more than any other method of 
warfare.”314 These views were reflected in the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, 
which had banned not only chemical weapons use, but also “the use of 
bacteriological methods of warfare.”315  
Enthusiasm for regulating bacteriological methods notwithstanding, the 
Protocol’s ban proved inadequate in three important respects. First, it 
made no effort to define the scope of its prohibition. No definition or 
technical annex accompanies the Protocol. Second, as with its treatment of 
chemical weapons, it did not prohibit development, production or stockpil-
ing of biological weapons. Finally, the bacteriological ban fell prey to ex-
tensive reservations with respect to reciprocity filed by many State par-
ties.316 
By the 1970s, these shortcomings, evidenced by the horrific use of bio-
logical weapons by Japan during the Second World War317 and frightening 
developments in States’ capacity to produce and disseminate biological 
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agents,318 provoked sufficient concern to update the law. By 1972, States 
concluded the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production 
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
Their Destruction.319 In addition to reinforcing the 1925 Protocol’s ban on 
use, the 1972 Convention effectively rendered biological weapons interna-
tional contraband, except for narrow purposes related to research. Alt-
hough it, curiously, does not address use of biological weapons directly, the 
Convention’s prohibitions on their development, stockpiling and produc-
tion render use practically impossible.320 Moreover, State parties to the 
Convention confirmed at their Fourth Review Conference an understand-
ing that use was prohibited.321  
Air Commodore Boothby assesses the Biological Convention as “argu-
ably, the first treaty to have prohibited entirely a category of weapon.”322 
Currently, there are 171 State parties to the Biological Convention.323 Since 
the Convention’s entry into force, scheduled review conferences have fo-
cused on developing binding verification measures acceptable to States.324 
Greatly complicating efforts to verify compliance with the Convention and 
undermining its effectiveness at eliminating biological weapons is the “mul-
tiuse dilemma.” Koblentz notes “the skills, materials, and technology need-
ed to produce biological weapons are also necessary to develop defenses 
against them and to conduct civilian activities such as biomedical research 
and pharmaceutical production.”325 Multiuse, combined with their nearly 
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unrivaled capacity to inflict mass casualties through self-propagation and 
spread, makes biological weapons at once a tempting and problematic 
weapon despite apparently manifest State zeal for their prohibition. 
 
N. Nuclear Weapons 
 
Since their advent, nuclear weapons have been the object of persistent ef-
forts with respect to both arms control and specific law of war regulation 
or prohibition. As with other weapons of mass destruction, however, States 
have regularly excluded nuclear weapons from consideration in general de-
velopment of the law of war applicable to weapons. Yet unlike chemical 
and biological weapons, nuclear weapons are subject to no form of inde-
pendent law of war regulation. In fact, they may be regarded by some 
States to exist outside the realm of conventional law of war regulation alto-
gether. 
State exceptionalism with respect to nuclear weapons and law of war 
development dates to the immediate aftermath of their use at the end of 
the Second World War. After brief flashes of almost utopian interest in 
international stewardship of nuclear materials, nuclear States swiftly adopt-
ed stances against law of war regulation of nuclear weapons. States rejected 
early proposals to incorporate regulation of nuclear weapons into either the 
1925 Geneva Protocol regime or the 1949 Geneva Conventions.326 The 
expert meetings and diplomatic conference that produced the 1977 Addi-
tional Protocols saw several proposals to address nuclear weapons; howev-
er, each attempt met again with insistence that nuclear weapons were not a 
topic for discussion at these conferences.327 Not content to let these travaux 
préparatoires or even the agreed upon Protocols speak for themselves, a 
number of States reiterated their objections to including nuclear weapons 
in the ambit of the Protocols’ rules with nuclear weapon exclusionary 
statements on signature and accession. French and UK statements are rep-
resentative providing, respectively: 
 
Referring to the draft protocol drawn up by the International Committee 
of the Red Cross which constituted the basis of 1974–1977 Diplomatic 
Conference, the Government of the French Republic continues to con-
sider that the Protocol’s provisions concern exclusively conventional 
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weapons and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weap-
ons . . . .328 
 
It continues to be the understanding of the United Kingdom that the 
rules introduced by the Protocol apply exclusively to conventional weap-
ons without prejudice to any other rules of international law applicable to 
other types of weapons. In particular, the rules so introduced do not have 
any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weap-
ons.329 
 
Nuclear legal exceptionalism was not the exclusive view of nuclear 
powers nor AP I parties. Non-nuclear States, especially NATO members 
benefitting from the deterrence postures of allied nuclear powers affirmed 
the view that the Protocols had no application to nuclear weapons as 
well.330 And although not a party to the Protocols, the United States sub-
mitted an understanding at the time of its signature stating, “the rules es-
tablished by this protocol were not intended to have any effect on and do 
not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.”331 Attempts to incor-
porate nuclear weapons regulation into the UN-sponsored weapons regula-
tion processes met resistance from States as well. Indeed the very title of 
the proceedings and resulting treaty confirm as much with their prominent 
reference to “Certain Conventional Weapons.”  
Even by the mid-1990s, amid thawing of Cold War postures, it seems 
nuclear powers’ resolve to except nuclear weapons from regulation re-
mained largely unabated. In 1993, the World Health Organization prompt-
ed an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) con-
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cerning the legality of nuclear weapons under international law.332 The 
Court devoted specific attention to the status of nuclear weapons under the 
law of war. Nuclear powers reiterated positions held throughout the weap-
ons conferences of the 1970s and 1980s. The United States submitted a 
representative statement in response to the litigation that provided, “It is 
apparent that none of [the Protocol I] prohibitions was negotiated with 
nuclear weapons in mind and would not have been adopted had they been 
thought to be applicable to nuclear weapons.”333 
Though firm in their rejection of the application of the “new” and fine-
ly-tuned rules of Additional Protocol I to nuclear weapons, States did not 
characterize use of nuclear weapons as entirely extra-legal. Even the United 
States admitted that, at minimum, the principles of discrimination and un-
necessary suffering operated with respect to nuclear weapons.334 The ICJ 
concluded similarly, confirming the cardinal principles of discrimination 
and unnecessary suffering and advised that nuclear weapons use would 
generally violate the law of war.335 However, the Court ultimately advised 
that it “cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality” 
of nuclear weapons per se.336 The advisory opinion, combined with States’ 
views on non-application of the Additional Protocol I refinements to tar-
geting law, have left regulation of nuclear weapons largely to the uncertain-
ties and ambiguities of law of war custom and principles. Ultimately, nucle-
ar weapons have proved remarkably regulation resistant. Not even the pro-
spect of human annihilation has proved sufficient to overcome nuclear 
States’ confirmed belief that these widely deployed weapons, offering 
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IV. IDENTIFYING REGULATION TOLERANCE  
AND REGULATION RESISTANCE 
 
As the preceding surveys of law of war principles and specific regulations 
have illustrated, States and private actors that seek to establish law of war 
limits on weapons face significant uncertainties. Even with widely acknowl-
edged principles to guide the regulation of weapons, weapons law propo-
nents face a difficult task securing sufficient agreement on the precise con-
tent and meaning of these principles to achieve meaningful and effective 
limitations on weapons. And despite a noteworthy catalog of specific trea-
ties to regulate and even ban certain weapons, the challenge of convincing 
the vastly heterogeneous community of States, and especially that of mili-
tarily significant States, to go along often prevents even the most logical 
and attractive humanitarian limitations from succeeding. Meanwhile, in 
many cases the immense investments of political, diplomatic and financial 
capital required greatly reduce opportunities for progress. Therefore, as-
sessing the prospects of success in advance of any campaign to advance 
weapons law is a matter of equal difficulty and importance. 
The three principles of unnecessary suffering, discrimination and honor 
certainly remain the primary indicators for predicting regulatory success. 
States have obviously coalesced around views that some weapons violate 
these law of war principles per se. For example, non-detectable fragments 
presented a sufficiently compelling case with respect to unnecessary suffer-
ing to achieve consensus among CCW parties. Early in the twentieth centu-
ry, States quickly agreed that biological weapons could not be used con-
sistent with the principle of discrimination. And poison seems clearly to 
have run afoul of most States’ senses of the honor and good faith required 
by the principle prohibiting treacherous means that has existed for the ma-
jority of recorded history.  
Yet clearly, forces and considerations beyond these law of war princi-
ples have played important parts in successful and failed efforts to regulate 
weapons through the law of war. The historical record recounted above 
suggests that further factors—factors associated with the weapons them-
selves—have also influenced States’ receptivity to or rejection of law of war 
regulation. This Part identifies these factors, associates them with historical 
weapons law efforts and correlates each, to the extent possible, with regula-
tion tolerance or resistance in future weapons law efforts. Specifically, the 
traits of effectiveness, novelty, deployment, medical compatibility, disrup-


















The most important factor in evaluating States’ willingness to regulate a 
weapon may be that of effectiveness. Efficacy in terms of permitting a bel-
ligerent to impose its will on an enemy is, after all, the raison d’être of weap-
ons. Accordingly, the historical record shows that States have rarely been 
willing to forfeit the service of a truly effective weapon in the name of hu-
manity. Bans on weapons such as non-detectable fragments and chemical 
and biological weapons may be just as much reflections of relative ineffec-
tiveness as these weapons’ propensity to inflict unnecessary suffering. To 
better understand effectiveness and to account for historical examples as 
accurately as possible, two notions of effectiveness can be identified. Effec-
tiveness with respect to access and effectiveness with respect to securing 
dominance or victory prove separate and useful indicators not only of bat-
tlefield outcomes, but also of regulatory results. 
Access constitutes a critical facet of weapon capabilities. Weapons that 
give unprecedented access have not only achieved remarkable tactical suc-
cess, but have also proved capable of tipping the operational and strategic 
balance of armed conflict. In particular, weapons capable of providing ac-
cess to previously inaccessible enemy forces and vulnerabilities have 
proved, at least until adequate defenses are devised and fielded, some of 
the most influential and effective weapons in history.  
Although true primarily at exceptionally low tactical levels, incendiaries 
greatly expanded attackers’ access to entrenched and fortified defenders in 
ways that few other weapons could rival or mimic. When employed against 
flammable defensive materials, incendiaries can extend an attacker’s reach 
far beyond the point of initial contact. When projected by pressurized 
means, flammable liquids are capable of reaching enemy forces in confined 
areas and reaching even further when they ignite materials that surround 
defenders. Although chemical gases and biological aerosols have also 
proved capable of permeating complex defenses, their residual effects, ex-
pense, delay in achieving effects and, most importantly, their potential for 
blowback on friendly forces make them far inferior to portable incendiar-
ies. Thus, despite intense campaigns to outlaw their use and compelling 
concern for the intense suffering they inflict on victims, incendiaries have 












ity to give effective access to enemy vulnerabilities. While CCW Protocol 
III managed to limit their use in areas of civilian concentration, incendiaries 
remain an entirely lawful weapon against military objectives and enemy 
combatants because, in large part, they provide nearly inimitable access and 
effective ability to achieve the desired effects. 
Effectiveness in terms of access to enemy vulnerabilities has proved an 
important consideration for more than weapons. By providing access re-
quired for effective attacks, delivery platforms such as missiles, aircraft, 
vessels and vehicles have played a crucial role in the history of warfare. 
Consistent with reluctance to regulate weapons that provide effective ac-
cess to enemy forces, States have proved especially reluctant to accept 
regulations on means of delivery that provide improved battlefield access. 
Although the First Hague Peace conference included a declaration banning 
use of balloons to deliver projectiles and explosives,337 that instrument 
proved to be exceptionally short-lived and ineffective. Drafted to expire 
after five years, the 1899 Hague Declaration IV was renewed in 1907;338 
however, several parties to the 1899 Declaration did not ratify the 1907 
Declaration, including France, Germany, Japan and Russia. And while 
technically still in force, the 1907 Declaration proved unable to restrict aer-
ial bombardment in any significant manner in subsequent conflicts. Regula-
tion of aerial bombardment moved away from restraints on aircraft per se 
and toward regulation of how and against which targets they could lawfully 
be used. The tactically and strategically critical access that new means of 
delivery made available throughout the twentieth century rendered them in 
nearly all cases exceptionally regulation resistant. Throughout the twentieth 
century, States consistently rejected attempts to develop limits on aircraft, 
submarines and other means of delivering weapons. Given the value States 
attach to effectiveness in terms of access to enemy vulnerabilities, emerging 
means of weapon delivery, especially those that increase access, seem likely 
to prove similarly regulation resistant. 
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Effectiveness can be also accounted for through a weapon’s capacity to 
achieve dominance or even win wars. Some weapons have simply proved 
to be game changers, tipping the tactical, operational and even strategic 
balance in favor of those who wield them. Nuclear weapons surely repre-
sent the best example of weapons capable of imposing a decisive defeat on 
even a determined and capable enemy. The United States’ use of atomic 
bombs against Japan was an unprecedented example of how a single weap-
on can decisively alter, or at least greatly shorten, the course of an armed 
conflict.  
To be sure, war-winning effectiveness has often come at great cost in 
terms of humanity. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, while militarily 
decisive, came at the cost of immense civilian casualties. Moral complexi-
ties and even legal dilemmas provoked by their use persist decades later. 
And the war-winning capacity of nuclear weapons in the present interna-
tional security environment has been highly debatable for some time.339 
Whether the strategic effects achieved by the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
bombings could be replicated by nuclear weapons in a world that pits nu-
clear powers against one another developed into an entire field of study. 
Regardless, nuclear States remain committed to the effectiveness of nuclear 
weapons, either as war-winning weapons or as the only effective deterrents 
to enemies who might seek to use them. Meanwhile, non-nuclear States are 
expending enormous financial resources and political and human capital to 
develop them. The perceived war-winning effectiveness of nuclear weap-
ons, or the capacity to counter such use, surely explains a great deal about 
States persistent rejection of law of war regulation of these terrifying weap-
ons. Despite their shocking, near unjustifiable consequences, nuclear 
weapons remain regulated by nothing more than the most general and ab-
stract principles of the law of war. Although unimaginable at present, it is 
likely that any new weapon with comparable war-winning capacity would 
prove equally resistant to law of war regulation. 
Conversely, weapons that are minimally or questionably effective have 
proved in many cases to be quite susceptible to law of war regulation. Alt-
hough widely deployed, chemical and biological weapons never appeared 
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to offer sufficient military advantage to be considered effective. Their chief 
military value appears to be their capacity to terrorize or, in the case of 
prepared defenders, to harass or momentarily hinder operations. Experi-
ence with the use of chemical weapons in the First World War did not re-
veal them to offer a war-winning contribution and States quickly agreed to 
a significant though qualified ban on their use, followed later by a compre-
hensive ban. It is likely that weapons that can be proved to offer similarly 
nominal military advantage will prove similarly susceptible to regulation. 
Present campaigns to regulate weapons seem already to have integrated this 
lesson into their efforts, offering detailed studies and data with respect to 




Most developments in weapons have been evolutionary in nature. “New” 
weapons have often proved simply to be improvements on existing de-
signs, offering little change in the nature or true character of their prede-
cessors. The very earliest stages of either development or deployment of 
new weapons present a mixed experience. On one hand, States have 
proved surprisingly willing to accept restraints on newly emerging technol-
ogies. Early twentieth century experience with aerial bombardment, biolog-
ical weapons and chemical weapons indicate a surprising willingness to 
regulate new military technology. On the other hand, States proved re-
sistant to early efforts to regulate nuclear weapons, as well as blinding lasers 
and submarines. The regulations developed with respect to the latter two 
either required sustained and prolonged effort, or produced highly ineffec-
tive limitations. At present, a “wait and see” approach seems to prevail 
with respect to prospective or early regulation of novel military technology. 
Understanding the impact of novelty and innovation on regulatory ac-
ceptance or rejection may require a deeper understanding of military atti-
tudes and culture. 
O’Connell identifies military attitudes towards weapons as critical de-
terminants of approval. In particular he notes that weapon ancestry pre-
dicts acceptance and suppression.341 Unsurprisingly, weapons that represent 
evolutions of established families of armaments with identifiable heritages, 
so-called “familiar compartments”—the missile to the catapult shot; the 
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armored formation to the phalanx; the naval cruiser to the trireme—enjoy 
ready acceptance.342 By contrast, new weapons lacking traceable ancestry 
find themselves prone to suppression.343 Initial reactions to projectile 
weapons, to submarines, to chemical weapons and to aerial warfare are his-
torically representative. 
Delving somewhat deeper into military acceptance and rejection of 
weapons, O’Connell notes the military profession’s preferences for deco-
rum and predictability.344 He observes,  
 
The urge to bring weapons under a specific body of rules and regulations 
would seem to have more than just a pragmatic basis. The ritualization of 
combat, as opposed to the more laissez-faire approach exemplified in 
predatory behavior, has always provided a major theme in weapons de-
velopment, and one that cannot be attributed wholly to humanistic mo-
tives. Rather, it follows that the inclination to fight by the rules, to use 
similar weapons in a prescribed fashion, is a vestige of intraspecific com-
bat.”345 
 
Although presently in decline, military professionals’ role in law of war 
formation has historically been significant. Military commanders and staff 
officers were frequent participants in late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century diplomatic conferences that produced law of war instruments. The 
records of committee meetings and plenary sessions alike feature their per-
spectives and indicate a high degree of deference toward their views, espe-
cially with respect to weapons regulations. So long as States accommodate 
military participation in weapons law conferences and diplomatic conven-
tions, novelty, and by implication military reactions to novel weapons, will 




Not far removed from novelty, but nonetheless sufficiently distinct to mer-
it separate consideration, is deployment. In this context, deployment refers 
to the extent to which a weapon has been acquired, fielded and integrated 
into States’ military operations. Weapons that have not yet been deployed 
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by States have proved somewhat tolerant of efforts at regulation or prohi-
bition. Not surprisingly, widely deployed systems have proved, at least for 
long periods, to be prohibition resistant, but by no means prohibition 
proof. The record of widely deployed weapons with respect to regulation, 
rather than prohibition, has been somewhat more promising; States have 
proven occasionally willing to accept regulations on the use of widely de-
ployed weapons, but not to their ban.   
The notion that States might prove willing to regulate weapons that are 
not yet widely deployed, and therefore not widely combat tested, is sup-
ported by significant experience. At the time of the 1899 Hague Gas Decla-
ration, chemical weapons were not widely deployed among the major pow-
ers’ armed forces, nor had they yet seen significant battlefield use. At the 
time the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol addressed biological weapons, few 
States were thought to have fielded those weapons in operationally signifi-
cant numbers.  
More recently, Protocol IV to the CCW banned use of lasers designed 
to inflict blindness before any State had deployed or employed any such 
weapon in combat, a phenomenon often remarked on by weapons law 
commentators.346 Accounts of the effort to ban blinding lasers showcase 
reports that the U.S. Army had at least ten laser weapon systems in devel-
opment at the time of the UN conference that produced Protocol IV.347 
Most major military powers were believed to have laser weapon programs 
at the time as well.348 However, these systems seem to have been developed 
primarily to frustrate or incapacitate optical detection systems, and not as 
anti-personnel blinding systems.349 
For States and other actors interested in regulating widely deployed 
weapons, experience with regulating anti-personnel landmines and cluster 
munitions counsels patience and persistence. Both landmines and cluster 
munitions saw widespread deployment—the former in great numbers 
among a great number of armies, the latter, owing to technical sophistica-
tion and expense, in great numbers among significantly fewer, but still very 
large militaries. Campaigns to prohibit both weapons originated in the late 
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1960s and early 1970s push to address weapons generally. Neither effort 
saw any immediate success, yet each ultimately produced both widely ac-
cepted regulations and increasingly ratified prohibitions. Experience with 
the two conventions prohibiting landmines and cluster munitions are par-
ticularly instructive as neither has yet achieved its ultimate goal of eradica-
tion. States that have invested most heavily in both landmines and cluster 
munitions, the United States, Russia and China in particular, have proved 
especially resistant to prohibitions, even in the face of growing stigma. 
Whether States’ failure to deploy weapons actually results in regulation 
or prohibition tolerance is undoubtedly tenuous. States are unlikely to de-
velop, acquire or deploy weapons that obviously run afoul of law of war 
principles. However, weapons widely deployed by States, such as landmines 
and cluster munitions, have been regulated and in some cases prohibited 
later after significant deployments. In this sense, deployment can account 
for shifting senses of humanity, public opinion or even what constitutes 
unnecessary suffering or discrimination. 
 
D. Medical Compatibility 
 
Weapons that produce wounds compatible with existing medical protocols 
and capable of treatment by means available in military and field hospitals 
have in many cases also proved resistant to regulation. For example, weap-
ons, such as small arms projectiles, fragmentation devices and flechettes 
that produce simple trauma have proved highly resistant to regulation. Mili-
tary medical units and humanitarian organizations’ field hospitals are expe-
rienced at treating, and are usually equipped to treat, trauma wounds. Alt-
hough innovations in physical trauma-producing weapons have repeatedly 
provoked efforts at regulation, few weapons, with the possible exceptions 
of landmines and cluster munitions, involving nothing more than increased 
physical trauma treatable by prevailing standards of medical care have 
yielded to meaningful regulation. 
By contrast, weapons that produce wounds incompatible with—or that 
frustrate or vex—prevailing protocols of medical care provided to war vic-
tims seem more tolerant or susceptible to regulation. Deliberate attempts 
to devise means of inflicting wounds that evade or dangerously complicate 
medical treatment seem highly likely to meet little resistance to regulation 
from States. 
Non-detectable fragments are a prime example of technology likely to 












tocols. Medical imaging used in military and humanitarian medical facilities 
relies heavily on x-ray detection of metal fragments to treat battlefield 
trauma. The tendency of undetectable fragments to evade this treatment 
protocol and to require unconventional exploratory surgery surely informs 
States receptivity to their prohibition. Similarly, barbed piercing weapons 
have long been prohibited, not merely for the increased suffering associat-
ed with their removal, but also for their incompatibility with standard med-
ical treatment protocols. 
Admittedly, the characteristic of medical compatibility is not entirely 
distinct from the well-recognized law of war principle of unnecessary suf-
fering. That principle has long considered wound severity and treatment 
prospects in its balancing calculus. It is also true that as a criterion for eval-
uating weapons, medical compatibility evokes memory of the failed SIrUS 
Project’s medical standards for evaluating unnecessary suffering. However, 
recognition of medical compatibility, while not itself a legal criterion, does 
offer a helpful refinement of the principle of unnecessary suffering. More-
over, based on historical practice, medical compatibility seems to offer im-
pressive predictive value. On initial examination, weapons producing medi-
cally challenging or novel wounds have proved marginally more tolerant of 
regulation than those producing routinely treatable injury. 
 
E. Disruptiveness  
 
Concerns for the socially and militarily disruptive effects of weapons seem 
to have motivated as many campaigns for law of war regulation as have 
concerns for inhumane effects. States owing their power or momentary 
hegemony to investments in existing military technologies have quite natu-
rally sought to limit, by a range of means, including international law, other 
States’ access to technology and weapons capable of disrupting that he-
gemony or displacing them from preeminence. Historical examples abound 
of attempts to use law to achieve, sustain or artificially prolong military 
technical advantages that could not be otherwise maintained in armories or 
on the battlefield. Few, if any, of these efforts have proved successful. Dis-
ruptive weapons have nearly always managed to find their way to the bat-
tlefield. Potential for social or military disruptiveness, therefore, seems an 
especially strong indicator of regulation resistance. 
Possibly the earliest—and certainly the best known and most recount-
ed—effort to regulate a militarily disruptive weapon is the Lateran Coun-













and concern for humanity, the ban is better explained as an effort to secure 
the battlefield preeminence of mounted nobility. The ban never proved 
effective. In subsequent centuries the crossbow inflicted not only enor-
mously effective casualties, but also resulted in much of the social and mili-
tary disruption that had concerned the Council. Although the crossbow 
ban predated the present State-centric international legal order, the feudal 
societies and orders that preceded States clearly rejected law of war regula-
tion of this highly disruptive weapon. 
Later efforts, similarly motivated to preempt or preclude disruptive 
weapons, met fates much like that of the crossbow ban. After firearms 
threatened the place of armored nobility—and later archers and other ma-
chine-powered weapons—efforts to ban them failed repeatedly. Subma-
rines proved a highly disruptive threat to the naval supremacy and empire 
of Great Britain, yet multiple efforts to ban them during the twentieth cen-
tury failed. And nuclear weapons, perhaps the most disruptive of all weap-
ons with their capacity to marginalize nearly any conventional weapon sys-
tem, provoked stark exceptionalism from States—perhaps the strongest 
regulation resistance yet demonstrated. 
The ban on poison presents an interesting study in disruption and law 
of war regulation. In addition to their capacity to instill fear in opposing 
forces and inflict atrocious suffering, poisons proved especially effective at 
disrupting social order. An important tool in assassinations, especially of 
high-level military and political leaders, poisons would seem by the theory 
offered here to have provoked a high degree of regulation resistance. 
States’ relative tolerance for poison regulation may require a caveat to the 
general experience of disruptive weapons’ regulation resistance. In defense 
of disruption as an indicator of regulation resistance, however, poison’s 
disruptive effects have tended to operate with respect to assassination ra-
ther than open combat. That is, while disruptive in a political sense, poison 
may not have proved to be especially disruptive in a military or military- 
technical sense. The ban on its use and States’ relative restraint with respect 





Even in liberal democracies, decisions about weapon development, pro-
curement and deployment are not usually made in public. Voters rarely 












lic opinion and public conscience have proved influential inputs in past 
efforts to revise weapons law. In the still blossoming Information Age, 
public perceptions of weapons and their effects are likely to be increasingly 
influential forces in international regulation of weapons. 
Historical experience reveals that some weapons have generated a 
greater degree of public notoriety than others. In some cases, as perhaps 
with poisons, public disapproval seems to have been sprung from innate 
human reactions. In other cases, such as anti-personnel landmines and 
cluster munitions, public notoriety and disapproval seems to have been 
spawned and cultivated by highly engineered, coordinated and impressively 
researched campaigns by civil society. As experience with landmines fur-
ther indicates, even weapons with characteristics that typically indicate reg-
ulation resistance, such as high levels of deployment and effectiveness, can 
be made regulation tolerant through patient and persistent lobbying to raise 
their notoriety. Whether by genetic or social engineering, the public image 
and resulting opinion of weapons have proved to greatly affect, and even 




As is true of most theories, to fully capture the complexity and enormity of 
reality, the theory of regulation tolerance and regulation resistance offered 
by this article must include some equivocations and concede some excep-
tions. Examination of an historical record as long and as varied as that of 
weapons regulation prevents perfect coherence and consistency with any 
theory. 
First, as previously noted, weapons’ technical properties and character-
istics are in no respect the exclusive determinates of whether States will 
tolerate or resist an effort to regulate them through the law of war. Politi-
cal, military, cultural, historical and religious factors may even take prece-
dence over factors related to the weapon itself. And in cases when these 
factors permit regulation, timing and even personalities may conspire either 
to facilitate or frustrate weapons law formation. It must then be clearly 
conceded that technical attributes and characteristics are but a few of many 
inputs that bear on whether a weapon proves regulation tolerant or re-
sistant. 
Furthermore, merely identifying technologies as either regulation re-
sistant or tolerant may be too simplistic. It is possible that a weapon may 













technology may be quite resistant to any effort to ban entirely its use or 
possession. Yet that same technology may simultaneously prove quite tol-
erant of efforts to develop limitations on its use through interpretation and 
application of existing principles, rules or precautions applicable to attacks. 
Poisons, again, present an interesting coincidence of characteristics. While 
capable of great social and military disruption and therefore historically in-
dicated to resist regulation, poisons also elicit strong human revulsion, are 
often not compatible with medical treatment, and require deception and 
secrecy that prevent them being used conspicuously—all indicators of 
regulation tolerance.  
Clearly then, some balancing is required in such cases. Strong showings 
with respect to regulation-tolerant characteristics might overcome con-
trasting, yet on aggregate weaker, indications of regulation-resistance. It is 
likely that the balance of these features, rather than any monolithic charac-
terization, is responsible for a weapon’s tolerance or resistance to law of 
war regulation. Even if this is correct, law of war legislators will surely find 
value in exploring further the occurrence of these and perhaps other quali-
ties in weapons identified for potential law of war regulation. 
Finally, there is an underappreciated two-way street between law and 
technology. While it is well understood that law influences the employment 
and operation of new technology, it is less appreciated that technology very 
often has a transformative effect on law. Confronted with new weapons 
technology, the international legal community, particularly non-
governmental components, responds quickly to the question, “What can 
law do to limit or control this technology?” That community devotes far 





Restraints on weapons may be a natural evolutionary phenomenon. An-
thropological research suggests that early hominid extinctions may be at-
tributable to an inability to control intra-species weapon use, rather than to 
predation or warfare with other hominid species.350 Thus, development of 
limitations on weapons and their use, expressed as cultural, ethical, legal or 
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other norms, may even be a fundamental tool of human survival and spe-
cies preservation. 
Notwithstanding its importance, predicting how States will adapt the 
law of war to weapons and military technological innovations has proved 
an exceptionally difficult and complex task. States have wavered between 
resort to principles and resort to specific rules with frustrating inconsisten-
cy. The prospects for genuine success at adapting the law to existing and 
emerging weapons are greatly dependent on an understanding of the inner 
workings of not only the technology of war, but also the processes, actors 
and influences that have historically formed the law of war applicable to 
weapons.  
History and experience play extraordinarily useful roles in crafting the-
ories to predict and evaluate new directions for weapons law. Indeed, a co-
herent and historically minded theory of law of war weapons regulation is 
essential to crafting strategies for future regulations. Part of a comprehen-
sive understanding of weapons law development has been the operation 
and influence of underappreciated characteristics and attributes of weapons 
themselves. Although application and understanding of the traditional law 
of war principles explains a great deal of existing weapons law, the previ-
ously ignored attributes and criteria identified by this article may advance 
understanding and contribute to more effective efforts to advance weapons 
law. By charting both the history and methodology of weapons law with a 
view toward identifying forces and influences that have made some weap-
ons susceptible to international regulation and made others resistant, this 
article offers a starting point for identifying sound investments of the very 
precious diplomatic, political and financial capital required to produce 
meaningful law of war developments. 
Regulating weapons alone is by no means sufficient to strike a desirable 
legal balance between humanity and military necessity. As Professor 
Schmitt argued nearly a decade ago, detection platforms and fire control 
systems are as important to achieving humanity in war—if not more so—
than the weapons they direct and guide.351 Regulation of the training, at-
tributes and conduct of the armed forces that employ weapons may be 
even more important facets of the international law of war. However, the 
rapid pace with which increasingly sophisticated means of warfare are de-
veloped and produced ensures a critical role for the regulation of weapons. 
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Identifying characteristics and qualities of new technologies that history 
indicates as contributing to either regulation tolerance or resistance is surely 
a worthwhile endeavor.  
 
 
